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Abstract 
This paper investigates why the United States is currently detaining immigrants at 
record high levels.  It profiles the cultural, business, and political influences that affect 
immigration detention policy.  The history, current laws, and politics that dictate the 
immigration detention system are examined, with special emphasis on current law 
enforcement partnerships between Immigration and Customs Enforcement and local law 
enforcement agencies.   This project also deconstructs who qualifies as a “criminal alien” 
and the due process protections that exist for non-citizens who are detained.  Eleven 
original policy recommendations for immigration detention are included near the 
conclusion. 
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Preface 
I have always been interested in the experiences of immigrants in the United 
States.  I – and probably all who read this – have been surrounded by first or second 
generation immigrants for our entire lives.  Whether we like it or not, they makeup a 
large portion of our country and shape the world we experience every day.  Immigrants 
are our family members, neighbors, employers, employees, coworkers, and friends.  The 
roughly 40 million foreign-born residents in the United States (Hansen) did not appear 
out of thin air.  They made the difficult decision to uproot from their homeland and 
transplant themselves to a distant and unfamiliar place.  Human migration like this is not 
easy to explain; every person has their own rationale for why they do it.  There are a 
number of complex factors that can push a person out of their country and pull them to 
the United States, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
It is 
impossible to 
fathom immigration 
to the U.S. without 
having lived the 
experience, and 
therefore a lot of 
Americans have a hard time empathizing with the plights of immigrants in our country.  
Since I was born in Denver, CO, I cannot fully understand what it is like to relocate my 
entire life to the U.S.  However, I think that traveling outside of the country to experience 
Source: www.DU.edu (see Architecture)    Figure 1  
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new places and people sheds light on immigration; it can serve to humanize people who 
are often discussed as statistics.  Foreign trips have molded my worldview in this way, 
most notably when I visited Mexico City as a young high school student.  It was in 
Mexico, Distrito Federal, that I truly mingled with poverty for the first time.  I was 
deeply moved by the countless fellow human beings that I saw in the streets begging for 
something to eat or even a single peso.  I was most struck by how many of them did not 
have shoes, while it is commonplace to trash mildly worn shoes in the U.S.  I still have 
vivid memories of that trip, and of one man in particular who was begging in the subway 
without shoes – because he had no legs.  For a long time I assumed that the poverty I saw 
in Mexico was a failure of economics or the social welfare system and therefore an issue 
that required political or private sector innovation to solve.  That may be the case, but it 
was not until years later that I associated a path to a better livelihood with the opportunity 
that comes with moving from one place to another: migration.   
Powerful films like El Norte (Gregory Nava, 1983) and A Better Life (Chris 
Weitz, 2011) helped expose me to the difficulties that face many immigrants upon arrival 
in the United States and played an integral role in the evolution of my thinking.  
However, it was not until my junior year of college during my semester abroad in South 
America that I truly realized how powerfully our country represents opportunity to people 
who want to improve their lives.  In South America I felt like everywhere I turned I 
encountered studious students - and no, that clause is not redundant.  The majority of the 
students I met there put me and my University of Colorado compatriots to shame.  I had a 
jarring realization that millions of students in South America (and all over the world) had 
committed their best efforts to succeed academically; meanwhile, after three years of 
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college I had been saving my best efforts for relaxation.  It was poignant to realize how I 
had been taking my top-notch opportunity for granted, and yet countless students all 
across the world would sacrifice, quite literally, everything they had in order to attend a 
university in the United States.  During the student protests that took place while I was in 
Santiago, Chile, my American classmates and I were forbidden (by the Chilean 
government and by our study abroad program) to be in the same sector of the city as the 
demonstrations.  So while my Chilean peers were facing tear gas and riot police in the 
name of accessible, quality education, I was home watching my favorite soap opera, 
Pobre Rico, or out with my American friends exploring a new bar.  Not only had I 
understood the hope that comes with immigration to the U.S., but how that hope is 
usually deeply rooted in education.   
During my first semester back at the University of Colorado I enrolled in Dr. 
Cathy Comstock’s class, Literature and Social Violence, and took advantage of an 
opportunity to practice my Spanish by volunteering at the Boulder Immigrant Legal 
Center.  These two endeavors conjoined when I wrote my term paper on immigration for 
Dr. Comstock’s class.  Although it was a valiant effort, the paper seemed insufficient. I 
had barely scratched the surface of what there was to learn about the field of immigration.  
That assignment was my first exposure to immigration detention (which is not surprising 
since immigrant detainees and detention center owners and operators each have valid 
personal reasons for wanting to avoid publicity).  I could not believe that hundreds of 
thousands of immigrants, just like those I have met in school or while volunteering, are 
locked up every year.  In my experience, these people have been nothing but caring, 
sweet, funny, and thoughtful, and almost all of them are here to create a better future for 
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their families.  Innumerable parents end up jailed in immigration detention after having 
come to this country in order to work exhausting, laborious jobs six days a week with the 
hope of one day giving their children the opportunity to attend college.  Exploring the 
apparently pervasive but well-concealed human rights abuses that take place in privately 
owned immigration detention facilities seemed like an appropriate and valuable thesis 
topic.  As I researched this project, I discovered that numerous advocacy and civil rights 
groups have already written in-depth on the human rights violations and have published 
numerous reports, detainee narrative accounts, and analyses of the abuses.  What 
emerged to me as the more interesting and compelling study was to investigate why and 
how immigrants end up in detention in the first place. 
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Part One: Introduction 
1.1 Statement of Purpose 
Immigration detention holds non-citizens who are awaiting a decision in 
immigration court, are already under an order of removal and awaiting their physical 
deportation, or are seeking entry to the United States for asylum.  The system was 
designed to detain documented and undocumented immigrants who are “flight risks,” i.e., 
presumed to not return to their court date, or to hold those who pose a dangerous risk to 
society.  As standard practice, the Department of Homeland Security places every 
removable individual into detention until they are deported, temporarily released on bail, 
or for asylum seekers, allowed to enter the county.  
In 1994, the daily population of detained immigrants in the U.S. was 5,000 people 
(The History).  Going into 2014 that daily population has grown to nearly 
34,000(“Immigration Detention”), an almost seven-fold growth.  Over the same time 
span, the foreign born population has only experienced a 1.7-fold growth (“America’s 
Foreign”).  The central question of this paper is: Why has the number of immigrant 
detentions increased so much that it has reached historically high levels?  Additional, 
ancillary questions include: Are these detentions just?  What recourses and protections 
are in place to ensure that individuals are not unjustly detained? 
There is a general lack of statistics on immigration detention, which makes it a 
difficult subject to study.  However, detention and deportation numbers are tightly 
correlated
1
 and the ample deportation statistics help fill holes in the data.  Since detention 
                                                 
1
 For different years, sometimes data is only available for immigrant detention and sometimes it is only 
available for deportations.   
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is a precursor to deportation and individuals rarely avoid deportation after being detained, 
their overall numbers move more or less in sync.
 2
 Over a similar time span that detention 
grew by seven times, annual deportations
3
 from the U.S. increased from 45,000 in to 
387,000 in FY2010 (U.S. Department), over an eight-fold growth. As Figure 2 illustrates, 
 
Figure 2                   Source: www.NYTimes.com (see Shear) 
                                                 
2
 For example, in 2011 429,000 immigrants were detained and in the same year 393,000
2
 were deported, a 
1.09:1 ratio.  Many detainees who were not deported that year were likely asylum seekers who were 
detained while attempting to enter the country.  
3
 According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), deportations or “removals” are the 
compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable alien out of the United States based 
on an order of removal. An alien who is removed has administrative or criminal consequences placed on 
subsequent reentry owing to the fact of the removal.  “Deportations” is often used interchangeably in the 
media for “removals,” which are different from “voluntary departures” or “returns.” 
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the rate of deportations, and detentions, clearly outpaces the rate of population growth.  
 
1.2 Rational vs. Emotional Responses, 
Are Immigrants Harmful of Beneficial? 
The history behind current U.S. immigration laws and policies is long and 
complicated, with origins that predate the country itself.  Each of the colonial 
governments in New England had its own sets of laws governing immigration.  Then, as 
now, the populace exhibited broad and varied opinions on immigration policies and who 
should be allowed to reside within their borders.  Some colonies and populations were 
more hostile than others.  One of the Founding Fathers, Benjamin Franklin’s vehemently 
anti-German views were among the most well known anti-immigrant opinions of the 
colonial era.  It is hard to imagine that Germans, who today are a part of the ethnic 
majority as they fall under the category “White/of European descent” were once seen as a 
very separate, criminal, and staunchly unwanted people by one of America’s historical 
heroes.  Then, as now, not all citizens were anti-immigrant.  Some colonies implemented 
policies to encourage immigration, like Maryland, which offered a tax-exemption on land 
ownership for a number of years to new residents in the colony (Proper).   
Since shortly after the colonies joined to create the Unites States, one set of 
federal laws has governed immigration for the entire country.  For more than two 
centuries the citizenry’s diverse personal beliefs have been in constant conflict and 
compromise in the process of deciding who is allowed into the United States.  
Immigration laws have changed and evolved over time to reflect the beliefs (or 
prejudices) of Americans during different periods of history.  Since its founding, the 
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United States has pinpointed various ethnic groups and races, sometimes politically and 
other times only culturally, as undesirable outsiders who pose threats to the fabric of 
American society.  People with heritage from every region of the world have been 
targeted at one point or another.  It appears that any time there has been a wave of 
immigration from a certain region, there has been a counteracting wave of immigration 
legislation and enforcement.
4
  Over time, these policies have expanded, repealed, and 
amended various portions of past and existing immigration laws.  However, a mere 
immigrant presence is not the only factor that provokes movements for a changed 
immigration system.  A myriad of other factors like rising crime, a lagging economy, 
foreign war, terrorism, and xenophobic fear (often the result of media/propaganda) have 
inflamed anti-immigrant beliefs in select parts of the U.S. population.  Whether the 
problems facing the United States are exacerbated or improved by immigrants, they are 
frequently scapegoats when things go wrong, a practice that is consistently rectified years 
later with the clarity of hindsight.  The rationale behind implementing stricter laws and 
enforcement policies varies based upon each unique iteration of the immigration reform 
process.  In the last few decades, some of the same historical anti-immigrant sentiments 
have gained traction in the forms of fear of terrorism targeted against people of Middle 
Eastern descent and concern about employment and economic strain aimed at people with 
Latino heritage, largely in response to September 11, 2001 and the Great Recession, 
respectively.   
In recent years, immigrants have commonly been blamed for lowering wages and 
stealing jobs, although there is debate over whether this is true.  It is entirely logical that 
                                                 
4As Dr. Daniel Jones has astutely pointed out, immigration policymaking follows Newton’s 3rd Law of 
Motion, that every action has an equal and opposite reaction. 
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if there are multiple options to fill a job the cheaper one will win out, and in many cases 
immigrant workers accept lower pay than citizens to perform a similar job; an out-of-
work citizen’s frustration is understandable.  On a large scale, the Economic Policy 
Institute explains that, “In the ongoing debate on immigration, there is broad agreement 
among academic economists that it has a small but positive impact on the wages of 
native-born workers overall: although new immigrant workers add to the labor supply, 
they also consume goods and services, which creates more jobs” (Shierholz).  Moreover, 
the American Enterprise Institute clarifies that immigrants often have different skill sets 
than American workers and therefore usually do not directly compete with them for jobs 
(Zavodny).  In fact, the report suggests that the two demographics can be mutually 
beneficial to one another by supplementing each other in the work force.     
In some cases immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants,
5
 are reproached 
as a drain on social services.  Critics frequently blame them for not paying enough in 
taxes but still using publicly funded services like hospitals and schools.  Analysis done at 
the Bell Policy Center found that in Colorado in 2010, undocumented immigrants cost the 
government $166 million and paid $167 million in taxes (Fairley). Although 
undocumented immigrants could pay more in taxes if they had legal status, in the current 
situation immigrants of all legal statuses are an economic net-positive for the United 
States.  Therefore, movements for more deportations or harsher immigrations laws based 
on economic arguments are, in general, unsubstantiated. 
                                                 
5
 Aside from this sentence, the phrase “illegal immigrant(s)” does not appear in this paper except when 
quoting an outside source.  The preferred and more accurate term is “undocumented immigrant.”  Labeling 
people as “illegal” is incorrect (a person can have illegal status, but they cannot themselves be illegal), 
insensitive, and only serves to dehumanize them.  Immigrants, regardless of their nationality or legal status, 
are human beings and should be treated and referred to as such.  A person may not have legal immigration 
status, they might be undocumented, but they are never illegal.   
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Economic issues are not the only concern that modern U.S. citizens have about 
immigrants.  Many Americans are suspicious of immigrants because they believe that 
immigrants are dangerous to American civil society because they are prone to incite 
violence and crime.  A survey of theoretical and empirical works on the connection 
between immigration and crime in 20
th
-century America found that, “despite claims by 
pundits and writers that high levels of ‘immigrant crime’ are an unavoidable product of 
immigration, scholars rarely produce any systematic evidence of this recently reemerging 
social problem” (Martinez Jr.).  As Figure 3 shows, immigrant men age 18-39 are five 
times less likely to be convicted of a crime and sent to prison than their native-born 
counter parts.  
 
Figure 3            Source: www.detentionwatchnetwork.org (see The Influence) 
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University of Colorado assistant professor of sociology, Tim Wadsworth, has conducted 
research that shows that cities with the largest increases of immigration between 1990-
2000 “tended to demonstrate sharper decreases in homicide and robbery."  Professor 
Wadsworth’s research concluded that an average 9.3% drop in homicide rates and a 
22.2% drop in robbery rates were the product of immigrant populations 
(Wadsworth).  Together, these data indicate that the native-born population in our 
country, not the immigrants, produces a higher rate of violent crime.  Although many 
Americans fear immigrant crime, immigrants are less likely to be to be criminals than 
native-born people. 
In the face of these data about crime and economics relating to immigration, 
immigrants seem beneficial to the United States overall.
6
  However, as in any population, 
immigrants include good and bad people.  Even though the immigrant population as a 
whole commits fewer crimes, there are still non-citizens who break the law in the United 
States.  Regardless of evidence, anti-immigrant movements inevitably gather some 
extreme members who essentially belong to the xenophobic or racist camps and want to 
remove as many immigrants as possible, while the extremists at the other end of the 
spectrum believe in amnesty and citizenship for all, without question.  With such varying 
beliefs, in addition to what policies to adopt, a core debate is how strictly to enforce the 
existing immigration laws.
7
  
  
                                                 
6
 Contrary to what many people believe, the immigration predicament facing our contemporary society is 
not sourced entirely, or even primarily, with undocumented immigrants. The broken immigration system 
affects non-citizens of every type of legal status and because there is so little reliable research explicitly on 
undocumented immigrants it is difficult to single them out for detailed study.  As such, the research on 
documented immigrants yields minimum standards for immigration detention and legal protections, which 
can only be assumed to be the same or worse for immigrants without legal status.   
7
 Interestingly enough, this might be the first time in history that immigrant voices, especially those of 
Latinos, hold enough political sway to influence the policy making process. 
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Part Two: Why Record Number of Detentions? 
This section enumerates the laws that have created and govern immigrant 
detention, as well as explains the influence of the private industrial complex on 
policymaking related to immigration detention.  
Understanding the strong link between deportation and immigration detention is 
fundamental to this paper.  As the system operates today, when ICE identifies a 
deportable individual they take custody of that person and place him/her into immigration 
detention until their deportation order has been processed.  Some non-citizens 
successfully appeal their deportation or are temporarily released from detention on bail, 
although both of these are quite rare.  To be clear, all persons who are forcibly deported 
by the United States are detained first; as deportations rise or fall, so do detentions and 
vice-versa.   
 
2.1 How Did We Get Here? 
The History of Immigration Detention 
In order to understand the current immigration detention system, it is important 
know the history behind it.  Even though there are centuries of social and political 
evolution behind current practice, since 1996 there have been especially significant legal 
developments that have shaped the landscape of immigration detention.  U.S. immigrant 
detention first started in a facility on Ellis Island in 1890 (“The History”), almost 115 
years after the Declaration of Independence, although immigration law and deportations 
on the continent have been around since the early 1600s.  About 60 years after the start of 
immigrant detention on Ellis Island, the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
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of 1952
8
 saw immigrant detention restricted to “cases in which an individual was a flight 
risk or posed a serious risk to society” (The History).  This limited use of detention 
remained in practice for about 30 years until President Reagan resurrected the practice of 
detaining large groups of immigrants via executive order in 1981 (Nofil).  It was an 
apparent political move, not as a response to economic or national security fears, but as a 
display of power over our own borders (Nofil), exhibited by “establish[ing] control” over 
rising immigrant populations (Ronald), especially asylum seekers coming from the Cuba 
and Haiti.  As with most executive orders, this was a relatively quiet policy shift, largely 
hidden from the view of the general public although its ultimate impact was extensive.  
Shortly after President Reagan began the practice of detaining asylum seekers, private 
prison corporations Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group Inc. 
(GEO) were founded in 1983 and 1984, respectively. Under contract with the U.S. 
government, CCA immediately began detaining immigrants.   President Reagan’s 
detention practices remained largely unchanged for over a decade and ultimately detained 
a relatively small number of immigrants compared to contemporary detention numbers.  
It was not until the mid 1990s that immigrant detention truly exploded. 
In 1996 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) passed 
Congress and were signed into law.  These laws were created largely in response to fear 
about immigrant crime, or more specifically, immigrant terrorism.  The AEDPA and the 
IIRIRA passed a few years after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and in the wake 
of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which was initially implied by several news outlets 
                                                 
8
 Originally vetoed by President Truman as a “discriminatory policy” but passed by the Congress largely in 
response to domestic fears of Communism (Harry). 
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to be the work of Islamic militants of Middle Eastern heritage (Johnston).  The mid 1990s 
connected domestic terrorism and immigrants for the first time, an idea that has since 
been reinforced by September 11, 2001 and the Boston Marathon Bombings in April, 
2013.  Aside from the Oklahoma City Bombing, all of these acts of domestic terror were 
perpetrated by foreign-born individuals.  The actions of these people have been used as 
justification for the detainment of non-citizens for national security purposes, extending 
from the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp and Abu Ghraib Prison to immigration 
detention facilities in the United States. 
The IIRIRA stipulated mandatory detention not only for asylum seekers, but also 
for a slew of criminal and drug offenses that belonged to the category of “aggravated 
felonies” even though some of them are not automatically felonies and many are not 
necessarily aggravated.  Overnight, the law declared many immigrants who were 
formerly allowed to stay in the United States as suddenly undesirable.  The law also 
expanded the criminal grounds for deportation and allowed for more state and local law 
enforcement to aid in enforcing the federal immigration law.  Simultaneously, AEDPA 
limited the role of the writ of habeas corpus and expanded the original definition of 
“aggravated felony,” a term that had originated in the 1988 Immigration and Nationality 
Act.  Aggravated felonies were originally only murder and weapons and drug trafficking, 
but were expanded so much that some qualifying crimes now include theft, failure to 
appear in court, and filing a false tax return (“Aggravated Felonies”).  A New York 
Times article, With Exquisite Cruelty (see Lewis), published in 1997 lamented the 
passage of the IIRIRA.  The article included an interview with immigration lawyer and 
author Stanley Mailman who voiced his regret about the law:  
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The law sets us back 100 years in its disrespect for due process.  It is pitiless in 
barring relief to those who have transgressed the law even in minor ways, 
including those with dependent U.S. families.  Decades of reasonable court 
decisions have been overturned in the effort to remove from immigration judges 
the discretion to administer the immigration law with mercy.  Worse than the 
individual hardship is the sacrifice of the system of adjudication that we depend 
on for fairness. 
The passage of these laws affected more than the actual persons targeted in the bills.  The 
laws not only required blind, mandatory detention for any person who met the criteria, 
but  helped create a culture of and capacity for detention as the default measure in 
enforcing immigration law.  Immigration detention has since spun out of control and far 
overstepped its intended purposes. 
 
2.2 The “Bed Mandate”  
In 2011 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained over 429,000 
immigrants, the most in history, in over 250 detention facilities nationwide (“Immigration 
Detention”).  At any given moment, around 33,400 immigrants are being held in 
detention (“Immigration Detention”). This number is the bed capacity of DHS 
immigration detention facilities, a capacity that is filled at nearly all times.  Some 
immigrants in detention do not have legal immigration status while others have legal 
status that is in the process of being revoked, either for committing crimes or otherwise 
violating the Immigration and Nationality Act.  These 429,000 detentions, more than 
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double the number of 202,000 in 2002, cost between $122-$167 per person each day, 
totaling over $2 billion annually (“President Obama”). 
There is a simple, two-part answer for why so many individuals are being 
detained in the modern era.  The first reason is that Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE)
9
 can detain and deport them.  ICE had a budget of nearly $6 billion in 
FY 2012 (FY 2012), enough to detain and deport around 400,000 individuals (Morton, 
“MEMORANDUM”), which the agency did.  Secondly, ICE detains and deports so many 
people because it must.  In 2006 Congress passed a “bed mandate” requiring ICE to hold 
a minimum number of individuals in detention at all times (Miroff).  By requiring a 
detention quota, it indirectly creates an accompanying deportation quota.   The mandate 
was passed during President George W. Bush’s administration, but was increased to 
34,000 in 2009 after President Obama took office.  According to Alabama Republican 
Representative Robert Aderholt it has since remained at that number “In response to the 
administration’s repeated attempts to water down enforcement” (Selway), even though 
deportations remain at all-time highs (see Figure 4).  As a reminder of the mandate, in 
February 2013 Texas Republican Michael McCaul, the Homeland Security Committee 
chairman in the House of Representatives, told ICE officials that they were “in clear 
violation of statute” when the detainee population fell to 30,773 after 2,200 people were 
                                                 
9
 Following the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) after September 11, 2001, 
U.S. immigration enforcement duties were relegated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and split 
into two agencies: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 
(CBP).  CBP patrols and secure the border and almost always returns an immigrant across the border as 
soon as they are caught attempting to make an unauthorized entry.  ICE has authority inside the Unites 
States’ borders.  Any immigration raid, apprehension, or detention that takes place within the interior of the 
country is carried out under ICE’s jurisdiction.  This paper focuses on ICE and interior enforcement which 
is the source of immigration detentions and deportations. 
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released to save money (Selway).  The bed mandate is effective at ensuring immigration 
enforcement and although ICE has pushed back against it, it remains in place.  
 
 
 
  
 
2.3 The Influence of Private Prison Corporations, Lobbying, and ALEC 
on Immigration Policy 
Over the past several years immigrant detention facilities have been split 
consistently, almost perfectly evenly, between privately-owned and government-owned 
detention facilities (usually local or state jails), meaning that in 2011 alone over $1 
Data for FY 2000-2001taken from DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008 
Data for FY 2002-2001 taken from DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2011 
Data for FY 2012 taken from ICE press release “FY 2012: ICE announces year-end removal 
numbers, highlights focus on key priorities and issues new national detainer guidance to further 
focus resources.”               
Figure 4     Source: AmericasVoiceOnline.org (see “Deportations”) 
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billion in tax dollars was spent on private prison contracts to detain over 200,000 
immigrants (see previous years’ total costs and detention population in Figure 5).   
Immigration detention has become a cash cow for the prison industrial complex
10
 and has 
prompted corporations to invest millions of dollars on government lobbying to boost 
profits.  The evolution of contract detention facilities over time, their lobbying records, 
and profits combine to imply that these corporations have played a pivotal role in 
immigration detention policy, especially in the last decade. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) holds immigration detention 
contracts with five different prison corporations.  By far the two largest contracts are with 
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and The GEO Group Inc. (GEO).  CCA, 
GEO, and the other corporations heavily lobby the government to protect their lucrative 
contracts and, if possible, to expand the number of immigrant detainees, thus inflating 
                                                 
10
 Detention is also a source of jobs and funding for local governments who contract bed space with ICE. 
Figure 5            Source: www.detentionwatchnetwork.org (see “The Influence”) 
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their profits.  Their lobby efforts focus primarily on the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives, where they advocate for specific legislative issues and bills as well as 
petition select elected officials via campaign contributions.  However, their lobbying is 
not limited to the legislature.  Through the use of seven different lobby agencies, 
sometimes employing five or six at one time, CCA lobbies various federal agencies such 
as the Department of Homeland Security (including ICE directly), the Department of 
Labor, the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the 
Administration for Families and Children (“The Influence”).  They are also directly 
involved in state politics as major supporters of the Republican Governors Association.  
CCA, who has the highest contracted bed capacity with DHS, has spent more money on 
lobbying efforts than any other prison corporation, with lobbying expenditures that total 
Figure 6                       Source: www.huffingtonpost.com (see Kirkham) 
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over $18 million from 1999-2009, with the highest concentration on the years 2003-2007 
during which they spent an average of $3 million per year (“The Influence”), exemplified 
in Figure 6.  From 2003, the start of the concentrated lobby years, to 2008, the year 
following the intense lobby period, deportations grew from around 210,000 to 360,000 
per year (shown in Figure 4).  As explained earlier, deportation rates are tightly correlated 
with detention rates, and the increases in deportation corresponded to inflated profits for 
private detention contractors.  From 2005 - 2009, GEO received dividends of $662 for 
every dollar they spent on federal lobbying while CCA received a return of $34:1 
(Cervantes).   
When Congress set the current bed mandate at 34,000 in 2009, CCA had 25 
lobbyists representing the company on budget and appropriations issues (Selway). 
Around that time CCA and GEO targeted key members of the House Appropriations 
Committee, which appropriates money to ICE and dictates how it will be spent (Selway).  
Committee Chairman John Carter, a Republican from Texas, was one of the primary 
beneficiaries of campaign contributions at that time and made a statement about the 
mandate, saying it “is an instrument to require ICE to actually enforce the law.  The 
[Obama Administration] may want to reduce those levels [of detainees] by releasing 
dangerous illegal criminals into the streets of America, but I stand firm in my belief [that] 
we must enforce the laws we have” (Selway).  This statement attempts to negate ICE 
Director John Morton’s directive that instructs enforcement efforts under the Obama 
Administration to focus on dangerous criminal aliens. 
It is time for a brief clarification.  Prison corporations are not breaking the law, 
per se, with their lobbying efforts.  They have a right to spend their money to lobby the 
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different governmental entities of the United States.  As discussed so far, there is not a 
legal issue with the actions of CCA, GEO and others like them.  They, like most large 
corporations, exert their influence to mold the laws in order to increase their profits.  
From a legal perspective they have done nothing wrong.  But from a human and civil 
rights perspective, the actions of these prison corporations are highly immoral.  The 
private immigration detention system is a perpetuator of structural violence, defined as 
“harm being done, life being deprived… because of the way things are put together,” a 
process in which “basic needs are treated as commodities in the marketplace” (Moore).  
As Dr. Robert D. Hare of the University of British Columbia has said of such large 
corporations, “the corporation is the prototypical psychopath” (“Who’s Who”), a 
prototype which includes characteristics such as being forceful, manipulative, egocentric 
and lacking in deep emotions, empathy, guilt, or remorse (Monahan).   
Determining the full impact that corrections corporations have had on the laws 
and policies governing immigrant detention and deportation becomes more convoluted in 
the face of their more clandestine operations outside of the traditional lobbying sphere.  
Evidence of informal relationships and exchanges between government officials and 
corrections corporations strongly suggests cronyism and potentially corruption.  One such 
custom is for Federal Bureau of Prisons
11
 (BOP) “directors, who have overseen the 
transfer of millions of dollars in contracts to the CCA, leaving government and then 
taking lucrative positions with CCA” (Reynolds).  At the very least this appears to be a 
conflict of interest in which a federal governmental official pumps up business and 
profits to a corporation before taking a high-salaried position there.  Such officials 
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 The Federal Bureau of Prisons is a federal executive agency that oversees all federal prisons in the 
United States including non-ICE owned nor contracted immigrant detention centers. 
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ostensibly get paid with the very contract money that they secured in the first place while 
working for the government, begging the question of whether the official was acting in 
the interests of the government and the people, the private corporation, or him/herself. 
CCA and other prison corporations have expanded their influence to state 
governments as well, an arena in which they receive considerably less oversight than 
their formal lobbying on the federal level.  According to its website, the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is “the nation’s largest, non-partisan, individual 
public-private membership association of state legislators… [that] works to advance the 
fundamental principles of free-market enterprise, limited government, and federalism at 
the state level….”  The organization, registered as a 501(c)(3) non-profit, is a key partner 
in prison corporations’ self-promotion at the state level.  In describing this organization, 
the New York Times stated that “special interests effectively turn ALEC’s lawmaker 
members into stealth lobbyists, providing them with talking points, signaling how they 
should vote, and collaborating on bills affecting hundreds of issues like school vouchers 
and tobacco taxes” (McIntire).  Business Week published that “part of ALEC’s mission is 
to present industry-backed legislation as grass-roots work” (Greeley).  The members that 
comprise ALEC are described most simply in The Nation as a “collaboration between 
multinational corporations and conservative state legislators” (Nichols).  ALEC’s efforts 
have been identified as a driving force behind a number of controversial state legislations 
including stand-your-ground laws, voter-ID laws, minimum and extended prison 
sentencing, and immigration detention.  ALEC operates by recruiting state-legislators, 
corporate members like Bank of America, Wal-Mart, Pfizer, and Verizon, and public 
members (who are often lobbyists).  Prison corporations GEO and CCA are also on the 
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list of corporate members.  Membership to ALEC requires an annual membership fee, 
$50 for legislators and at least $7,000 for private-sector members, some of whom paid up 
to $398,000 in 2012 (McIntire).  Over 2,000 of the total 7,382 state legislators (27%) in 
the U.S. are members, as well as at least 300 private corporations (“What is ALEC”).  
Throughout the year ALEC holds conferences that have corporate member-funded 
“scholarships” for legislators, including a four day retreat that includes $250,000 worth of 
daycare for members’ families (McIntire).  During their conferences, ALEC splits its 
members into eight issue-based task forces that are each lead by one legislator and one 
private-sector member (McIntire).  Task forces draft model legislation that legislators can 
take home and introduce in their state legislatures.  According the resident director of 
ALEC’s Public Safety and Elections Task Force, any bill submitted by a legislative or 
corporate member must be reviewed by both the public and private sector ALEC 
members before it can become model legislation (Hodai).  In many instances, legislators 
return home with bill language that was originally drafted by corporate lobbyists or 
lawyers and submit the bill to the state legislature as their own.  In fall 2011 Florida State 
Rep. Rachel Burgin introduced a resolution that was copied verbatim from legislation  
Figure 7            Source: ThinkProgress.org (see Seitz-Wald)   
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covertly drafted using input from ALEC-corporate members.  ALEC’s influence on the 
bill was easy to uncover because the first sentence Rep. Burgin’s bill was the ALEC 
mission statement (see Figure 7).  The bill was quickly withdrawn and resubmitted with 
more proper bill language (Seitz-Wald).   
Although secretive in the details of its operations, ALEC touts a very successful 
legislative track record boasting “that it has over 1,000 of these bills introduced by 
legislative members every year, with one in every five of them enacted into law” (“What 
is ALEC”).  While ALEC focuses on state government, it is venturing into the arena of 
federal lawmaking by maintaining relationships with its alumni, 82 of whom currently 
serve in the U.S. House of Representatives and 11 in the U.S. Senate, according to their 
website.  Little is known about ALEC’s state-level operations, but the dealings and 
influence that exist between ALEC and their members in the U.S. Legislature are even 
more clandestine.   
Many of the 200-or-so ALEC bills passed annually in state legislatures influence 
the laws and practices concerning immigration detention.  In the same spirit as their 
federal lobbying, CCA and GEO get returns on their investments in state level politics.  
The most famous (or infamous) example of ALEC influence in the realm of immigrant 
detention was in Arizona in 2010 in the shape of The Support Our Law Enforcement and 
Safe Neighborhoods Act, commonly known as SB 1070.  This bill was passed by the 
Arizona legislature and signed into law amid a national uproar of controversy and debate.  
The law would have essentially made federal immigration crimes illegal on the state level 
and opened the door for law enforcement officers to make lawful stops and arrests based 
on profiling a person’s physical appearance, both of which would have created more 
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immigration detainees.  An injunction issued by a federal judge among a flurry of 
constitutional challenges filed by several bodies including the ACLU and the U.S. 
Department of Justice prevented the law from taking effect.  Ultimately the constitutional 
challenges propelled the law to the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States (567 
U.S. 11-182).  The case involved challenges to four key provisions of the bill: (a) the 
creation of a state-crime for violation of federal registration laws, (b) the creation of a 
state-crime for working without authorization, (c) the requirement to verify citizenship of 
all detained persons, and (d) the authorization for police officers to make warrantless 
arrests based on probable cause of removability from the United States (ARIZONA).  Of 
the four provisions, only provision (c) was upheld, labeled as “constitutional on its face” 
(ARIZONA).  Ironically enough this provision was one of the most controversial of the 
law, with critics citing the possible racial profiling by law enforcement that could flourish 
under the provision.  In his majority opinion Justice Kennedy noted that officers 
operating under provision (c) may not consider race during a citizenship check and that 
even though the law might be constitutional, its application and enforcement may not be 
just.
12
  
Before SB 1070 was even enacted, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer received 
“substantial campaign financing from top CCA executives” and had already hired two 
former CCA lobbyists as top aides (Cervantes).  Even before taking office Gov. Brewer 
herself was an ALEC member (Fischer).  In response to the constitutional challenges that 
barred the implementation of the law, the Republican Governors Association, which had 
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 These words of caution hearken back to another landmark Supreme Court case concerning discrimination 
against immigrants, Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U.S. 356 (1886)), that found that even though a law may be 
constitutional in design, an unequal enforcement of the law contrived so as to target on specific group or 
class of people is unconstitutional in itself. 
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already received over $160,000 in contributions from CCA and GEO that year, sent out a 
nationwide solicitation asking for contributions to fund judicial actions in support of the 
law (Fischer).  The non-profit organization, The Center for Media and Democracy, has 
chronicled the path of SB 1070 through ALEC, the Arizona State House, and onto the 
desk of Governor Brewer.  Their research (see Fischer) shows that SB 1070’s primary 
sponsor, Arizona Senator Russell Pearce, had tried to pass similar legislation every year 
from 2005-2009.  In late 2009, with a new Republican governor who was a former ALEC 
member, Senator Pearce took his model legislation to an ALEC conference for 
assessment, rewriting, and corporate endorsement.  A few weeks later the “No Sanctuary 
Cities for Illegal Immigrants Act” came out of the ALEC Public Safety and Elections 
Task Force.
13
  In total about 50 people, including CCA officials (Sullivan), were involved 
in the drafting of the model bill.  Just weeks later, SB 1070 was introduced into the 
Arizona Legislature.  The bill was co-sponsored by 36 legislators, 24 of whom were 
associated with ALEC and 30 of whom quickly received campaign contributions from 
prison lobbyists or companies, including GEO and CCA (Sullivan).  One month before 
the bill was introduced, in December 2009, three GEO Executives and one of their 
spouses each made maximum campaign contributions of $410 to Arizona House Speaker 
Kirk Adams, who would later go on to support the House version of SB 1070 and preside 
over its passage (Hodai). 
 Overall, it appears that SB 1070 was passed entirely because of the lobbying 
influence of prison corporations.  Senator Pearce had tried and failed in four successive 
years to pass such legislation, each time failing to garner enough support from his 
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 This task force has since been disbanded amid controversy and withdrawals of corporate sponsorship 
following the exposure of ties between ALEC and SB 1070.  Without the Public Safety and Elections Task 
Force ALEC has eight remaining task forces. 
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democratically elected colleagues.  The bill quickly passed after consulting with ALEC 
and its corporate prison representatives, redrafting legislation with their input and 
blessing, and then introducing the bill to a legislative body in which several members 
received campaign contributions from CCA and GEO in exchange for sponsoring the bill.  
The private prison corporations saw an opportunity to create more detainees and they 
successfully used their resources to make the bill law. 
 A lawyer for ALEC has acknowledged that the group’s surreptitious interactions 
with lawmakers could fit the federal definition of lobbying, save for a provision that 
exempts such interactions when they are the product of “non partisan research and 
analysis” (McIntire).  However, in order qualify for this technicality, ALEC must prove 
itself to be non-partisan.  A simple look at the group shows that of 104 leadership 
positions, 103 are filled with Republicans and the policies that they support “are nearly 
uniformly conservative” (McIntire).  Unless consistent promotion of conservative 
policies and over 99% Republican leadership qualifies as non-partisan, then ALEC is 
lobbying illegally.  More explicit than the elusive definitions of lobbying, under federal 
tax law a 501(3)(c) organization like ALEC may not participate in the formation of 
legislation (Hodai).  One Arizona legislator, Steve Farley, was so concerned about the 
group’s influence that he introduced the ALEC Accountability Act with this rationale 
(see The United States of ALEC): 
I just want to emphasize it’s fine for corporations to be involved in the process. 
Corporations have the right to present their arguments, but they don’t have the 
right to do it secretly. They don’t have the right to lobby people and not register 
as lobbyists. They don’t have the right to take people away on trips, convince 
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them of it, send them back here, and then nobody has seen what’s gone on and 
how that legislator had gotten that idea and where is it coming from. All I’m 
asking... is to make sure that all of those expenses are reported as if they are 
lobbying expenses and all those gifts that legislators received are reported as if 
they’re receiving gifts from lobbyists. So the public can find out and make up 
their own minds about who is influencing what. 
 
The daily capacity of immigration detention has risen 72% since 2001 (Siskin).  
The various pieces of evidence, from federal lobbying to state level ALEC partnerships, 
combine to form a compelling argument that in recent years prison corporations have 
been successfully exerting their influence to impact the laws governing immigration 
enforcement in the United States.  They have tried, and often succeeded in increasing the 
numbers of immigrants that they can detain in their contracted facilities.
14
  Although the 
impact appears to be widespread in immigration law and enforcement policies, the exact 
locations where it manifests are difficult to identify. 
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 In many cases immigration offenses, violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) like illegal 
reentry, are criminal in nature and thus punishable with prison and a fine.  In some instances INA violations 
are civil in nature and punishable by fine only, such as failure to depart (U.S.C. 8 §1324D).  In other cases, 
non-citizens violate the INA by committing crimes within the country, in which case their criminal 
prosecutions (with any resulting prison) and immigration prosecutions are conducted separately.  After 
deportable criminals have served any prison sentences for committing crimes, they are turned over to ICE.  
If only a civil violation of the INA, the individual is booked directly into ICE custody. ICE places 
immigrants into detention while processing their deportation.  In some cases, this allows prison 
corporations to double dip, by holding an immigrant first in their prison and then in their prison-like 
immigration detention. 
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Part Three: Strategic Immigration Enforcement 
This section addresses how the Obama Administration has responded to the 
immigration enforcement “bed mandate” quota by focusing efforts on violent and 
dangerous immigrants.  However, all three local enforcement programs, CAP, 287(g), 
and Secure Communities appear to deviate from ICE’s focused enforcement goals.  
Studies into their operative procedures show evidence of abuse of authority, racial 
profiling, and wrongful arrests.  This manner of enforcing immigration law has resulted 
in an immigration detention system in which only about 11% of detainees have 
committed violent crimes (Letter from).  
 
3.1 Enforcement Directives in Response to the Bed Mandate 
While serving as Director of the Department of Homeland Security, Janet 
Napolitano, called the detention bed mandate “artificial… an arbitrary bed number” and 
said “we ought to be detaining according to our priorities, according to public-safety 
threats, level of offense and the like, not an arbitrary bed number” (Selway). In response 
to the mandate, the Obama administration has directed its enforcement agents to focus 
their limited resources on catching and removing criminal aliens, as a way of most fairly 
enforcing the mandate.  Directives, such as those from ICE Director John Morton, clarify 
that interior enforcement should focus on violent criminal aliens, those who pose a 
dangerous threat to civil society.  Individuals of highest priority are “Aliens who pose a 
risk to national security or public safety…[including] aliens convicted of crimes, with a 
particular emphasis on violent criminals, felons, and repeat offenders…[and] aliens who 
otherwise pose a serious risk to public safety” (Morton, “MEMORANDUM”).  This 
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enforcement strategy is fair and logical, and statistics show that criminal deportations 
comprise a greater share of the annual deportations and detentions (refer to Figure 4 for 
deportation statistics).
 15
 
However, in the face of record deportations, immigrant advocates claim that the 
criminal alien enforcement policies have become unfair and discriminatory and that many 
criminal detentions and deportations are of non-violent individuals (Shear). Despite 
specific enforcement guidelines and statistics that would seem to suggest otherwise, 
detentions and deportations of criminal aliens rarely follow the ICE directives to focus on 
violent and dangerous individuals. 
 
3.2 The Definition of “Criminal” Aliens 
On multiple occasions the Obama Administration has affirmed that the 
enforcement of our immigration laws should focus primarily on “criminal aliens” 
(Caldwell).  This term will usually conjure up images of deporting non-citizens who 
commit murders, heinous assaults, violent robberies, kidnappings and the like, as the 
aforementioned ICE directive.  In fact, in a speech President Obama said, “We are 
deporting those who are here illegally.  But I want to emphasize we’re not doing it 
haphazardly... We’re focusing our limited resources and people on violent offenders and 
people convicted of crimes, not just families, not just folks who are just looking to scrape 
together an income" (“Remarks by”).  However, remarks like these are misleading, and 
problems with concentrating enforcement on this area have surfaced because there is not 
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loose definition of “criminal alien.” 
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an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a “criminal alien.”  The definition in the 
minds of the general public and the working definition used by ICE are often far removed 
from each other.  This is an important gap not only because the people are the ultimate 
source of power and accountability for the government, but because the deportation of 
criminal aliens is an often cited statistic in the immigration policy debate, especially in 
defense of persistent immigration enforcement, just as President Obama continued in his 
speech, “as a result, we’ve increased the removal of criminals by 70 percent.” 
ICE counts every non-citizen with any criminal conviction, even misdemeanor 
traffic violations, as a criminal alien.  In the agency’s published deportation statistics, it 
does not distinguish among criminal aliens based on the severity of their crime, but only 
whether a crime has been committed (and under which category of the law such as traffic 
or drugs, in more detailed reports). Therefore, if the Department of Homeland security 
publishes that it deported 200,000 criminal aliens in a year, 80% of them can simply be 
bad drivers.  Thousands and thousands of people are detained (and most of them 
deported) every year based on the “criminal” label, but most of them have never harmed 
or endangered U.S. society. 
 ICE regularly labels a person a “criminal alien” simply because they have violated 
the Immigration and Nationality Act by illegally crossing the border.
16
  These individuals 
have lived perfectly within the law since they crossed into our country.  Prosecutions for 
illegal entry and illegal reentry have risen 1,400 and 300 percent, respectively, in the last 
10 years (“US: Prosecuting”).  Not only is illegal reentry now the most common federal 
immigration charge, but it is the most prosecuted federal crime (Anton).  This means that 
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the offending individuals are not simply removed from the country as was common in the 
past, but now immigrants are being prosecuted for these immigration crimes, serve prison 
sentences, and then after “paying their debt to society” are still deported.  In 2011, nearly 
20% of Department of Homeland Security “criminal” removals were the result of 
immigration offenses (Simanski).  This means that in one out of every five criminal 
deportations
17
 the “criminals” did no harm to our country except by entering it or by 
staying here longer than they were originally permitted.  Illegal reentry criminal 
prosecutions have been on the rise and have surpassed illegal entry criminal prosecutions 
(Simansky), meaning that at least 17,000 people were deported from the U.S. as a result 
of returning (or trying to return) to lives that they had previously established in the 
country. It is safe to assume that illegal reentry is most often a return to an established life 
in the United States.  A Pew Research study on undocumented immigrants in 2011 found 
that 85% have been in the United States for five years or more (Skerry).  The act of 
illegal reentry does not only apply to a person who was undocumented when they were 
deported from the U.S. the first time; it applies to anyone who has returned to the U.S. 
after being forcibly removed, for instance a person who had legal status but was deported 
after overstaying their visa.  Still the Pew study does provide insight.  In cases when an 
illegal reentrant was undocumented the first time around, there is an 85% chance that 
they had already been residing in the U.S. for at least five years.  
Fiscal year 2012 saw over 80,000 new criminal convictions on the same 
immigration charges (“US: Prosecuting”).  These individuals are not deported until after 
they have served the prison time required for their criminal conviction(s) which, in 
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the U.S.  However, most of them are not violent or dangerous. 
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addition to the injustice, also contributes to an already crowded penal system. Illegal 
entry is a misdemeanor, with a maximum prison sentence of six months. A second illegal 
entry used to carry a prison sentence up to two years, thus classifying it as a felony, until 
the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (commonly 
known as the Assault Weapons Ban).  This act increased the maximum penalties for 
illegal reentry to 10-20 years in prison, depending on the specifics of the original 
removal. The Act also classified it as an aggravated felony, providing for expedited 
deportation which is not subject to judicial review.  All of these immigration convictions 
boost ICE’s deportation statistics of “criminal aliens,” increase the prison population, and 
severely punish individuals who have not necessarily committed any other crime, much 
less a violent one.  In these cases, the long prison sentences and automatic deportations 
appear to be far more severe retributions than the original border crossing.    
 Drug offenses and traffic offenses, both of which qualify the offender as a 
criminal alien, each accounted for 43,000 deportations in 2011 (Simanski).  These 
categories are both unique in their criminal nature because they do not necessarily affect 
people aside from the perpetrator.  For instance, more than four-fifths of drug related 
arrests are only for possession (Drug Law).  ICE views all drug offenses seriously, even 
though they are usually not grave and despite the fact that a lot of the country has shown 
leniency on drug related charges.  Municipalities in every U.S. state recognize the unique, 
non-threatening nature of drug offenses through their use of specially designated drug 
courts (“Drug Courts”).  Drug courts acknowledge the unique nature of drug crimes and 
substance abuse, and aim to rectify most drug convictions through drug treatment and 
community service, not harsh and ineffective penalties like prison.  The district attorney’s 
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office in Denver, CO endorses the Denver Drug Court saying that, “It is a specialized 
court designed to give offenders the responsibility of their substance abuse problem 
through probation supervision and close judicial oversight. In doing so, Drug Court 
encourages public safety and individual responsibility, a reduction in crime and an 
improvement in the quality of life for the participants and their families” (“Denver Drug 
Court”).  Most of these drug offenders have not physically harmed anyone but 
themselves.  Additionally, drug use is not necessarily harmful as entire state governments 
in Colorado and Washington now allow certain amounts of marijuana possession for 
recreational purposes.  Minor drug possession is not a behavior that our nation views as 
morally deplorable enough to imprison people, let alone remove them from the country.  
Nonetheless, despite legal and judicial approaches across the country, all drug crimes are 
used as rationale for deportation an included in the “criminal alien” category.  A report by 
the Center for Criminal and Juvenile Justice found that a having a prior conviction for a 
traffic offense or the possession of less than one ounce of marijuana was more likely to 
lead to an undocumented immigrant’s detention than a prior rape, homicide, robbery, or 
aggravated assault conviction (Males). 
 The enforcement focus on “criminal aliens” is very significant because, as 
mentioned before, 80,000 criminal deportations each year (and rising) affect immigrants 
who may not have committed any crime aside from entering the country.  They are not 
the violent and dangerous criminals whom ICE claims to prioritize.  Essentially 80,000 
aliens are deported annually on criminal grounds that are not based on behavior or 
character, but on migration patterns.  These people are deported as criminals without any 
evidence that they conducted themselves any differently than every law abiding U.S. 
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citizen.  Furthermore, if you assume that half of drug and traffic related crimes were not 
violent or harmful to other people (a conservative estimate), the total number of 
individuals deported on non-dangerous, non-violent but still criminal grounds topped 
150,000 a year in 2011-12.  This number equates to at least 43% of all criminal 
deportations carried out against non-violent, non-dangerous, non-threatening “criminals.” 
 
3.3 Local Law Enforcement Partnerships in Criminal Alien Enforcement Programs: 
CAP, 287(g), and Secure Communities 
 In order to better focus immigration enforcement on “criminal aliens” the Obama 
Administration has relied heavily on partnerships between ICE and state/local law 
enforcement agencies.  These partnerships exist with the goal of catching and deporting 
criminal aliens, and provide far more man-power to enforce immigration laws than ICE 
can provide on its own.  The partnerships function in the form of three programs, the 
Criminal Alien Program (CAP), Secure Communities, and Section 287(g) of the INA (see 
Figure 8 for an overview of criminal alien enforcement programs).  The reliance on these 
partnerships has grown substantially under President Obama, marking a departure from 
Bush-era immigration raids.  In all of these programs, deportable individuals are 
identified following contact with local law enforcement, at which point ICE issues 
immigration detainers (also known as ICE detainers).  These detainers essentially 
function as formal requests from ICE to local law enforcement asking that they detain the 
individual for up to an additional 48 hours after the end of local jurisdiction (excluding 
weekends and holidays) until ICE can take custody.  A detainer signifies that ICE 
suspects that the individual is deportable and that an investigation into their deportation 
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status has begun.  After ICE takes custody, they place the individuals into federal 
immigration detention
18
 to wait out their deportation proceedings.   
 
Figure 8   
Note: NFOP is an ICE criminal enforcement program that does not partner with local law enforcement. 
The Criminal Alien Program, or CAP, operates in every federal and state prison 
across the country, as well as in over 300 county jails.  The purpose of the program is to 
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identify deportable non-citizens who have criminal records.  It is responsible for 
detaining the most removable individuals, having been credited with the identification of 
48% of all removable individuals detained by ICE in 2009 (“The Criminal”).  While the 
mission statement and perceived purpose of the program are to focus enforcement efforts 
on dangerous criminals, there is severe controversy over whether the program is fulfilling 
its obligations.  Critics of the program caution about the possibility that the program 
allows law enforcement officers to make arrests based on racial profiling.  A report 
published by the Department of Homeland Security in 2009 found that 57% of 
immigrants detained as a result of CAP had no criminal convictions, having only been 
charged with a crime (Waslin).  Furthermore, the study looked at one county in Texas 
and found that of their immigration detainers, 58% were placed on individuals who were 
only charged with misdemeanors. 
In general, all of CAP’s operations are shrouded in a conspicuous amount of 
secrecy.  There has been such a lack of transparency that several prominent immigration 
legal bodies united to file a lawsuit
19
 against the DHS to provide more information about 
dealings and the outcomes of the program.  The lawsuit by the American Immigration 
Council, the Immigrant Rights Advocacy Clinic of Yale Law School, and the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association was successful.  The court-approved settlement 
requires that ICE begin to publicize formerly confidential records by late October 2013 
including (see “Uncovering”):  
 Information about CAP policies, implementation, and operation such as 
interviewing procedures and arrest quotas. 
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 Information about the relationship between CAP and other of the agencies 
programs. 
 Information about racial profiling within the implementation of the program; and 
 Reports of all encounters between agency officials and people that have fallen 
under the program since 2010. 
The American Immigration Council will review and analyze the records.  Given the 
covert nature of the CAP program, allegations of racial profiling, and apparent straying 
from the purpose of identifying convicted immigrants, this new information has the 
potential to expose around 50% of all deportations – perhaps as many as 200,000 
annually – as flawed.   
 The IIRIRA of 1996 included section 287(g), which created another program that 
operates in local jurisdictions.  The 287(g) program allows the federal government to 
create agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies and grant them authority 
to enforce the federal immigration law.  After receiving training from ICE agents, local 
law enforcement officers have the authorization to identify, process, and detain 
immigration offenders that they encounter while fulfilling their normal law enforcement 
duties.  The actions of local law enforcement under 287(g) are authorized pursuant to 
memoranda of agreement between the local jurisdiction and the federal government, with 
all additional costs paid by the local enforcement partner.  This program remained unused 
for its first six years of existence, until after September 11, 2001.  In 2002 the State of 
Florida was the first government to sign up for the program and Alabama followed suit in 
2003. At the beginning, the memoranda of agreement were constructed on a case-by-case 
basis, allowing for different standards and practices across the various jurisdictions.  This 
  Irving 42  
allowed different jurisdictions to tailor how - and on whom - they would enforce 
immigration law.  This freedom was exploited to create, almost exclusively, 
municipalities that set their own enforcement priorities and operated all but 
independently from ICE.  By September 2006 there were seven participating 
jurisdictions.  One of those, Mecklenburg County, NC joined 287(g) in February of that 
year with the goal of “apprehending as many unauthorized immigrants as possible” 
(Capps).  Their efforts in identifying individuals for deportation ended up being so 
overwhelming that the DHS “had to reassign ICE agents to deal with the numbers” 
(Pendergraph). 
 In 2007 the Sherriff of Mecklenburg County, Jim Pendergraph, became the head 
of ICE’s Office of State and Local Coordination.  Under his tenure from 2007 to 2008, 
ICE entered into 55 new 287(g) agreements, all of which echoed the language used in the 
Mecklenburg County Memorandum of Agreement (Capps).  According to an ICE fact 
sheet in 2007, the 287(g) program was intended to focus on “violent crimes, human 
smuggling, gang/organized crime activity, sexual-related offenses, narcotics smuggling, 
and money laundering,” and “is not designed to allow state and local agencies to perform 
random street operations” (ICE, “Delegation”).  The next year, the limiting, and 
clarifying language did not appear in the fact sheet (“Delegation of”), indicating that 
287(g) had changed in policy, practice, and in public communication.  The inference is 
that in many of these jurisdictions racial profiling became an issue and local officers were 
apprehending individuals for petty, negligible offenses.  That year turned out to be the 
height of the program, with 287(g) accounting for over 45,000 identifications (Vaughn). 
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In July 2009 DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that ICE would 
standardize the Memorandum of Agreement used in all existing and future 287(g) 
agreements.  At the time ICE had entered into at least 62 agreements with local law 
enforcement agencies under 287(g).  The move was intended to provide consistency 
across all jurisdictions and to re-focus the priorities of the program on dangerous aliens, 
specifically by discouraging arrests “for minor offenses as a guise to initiate removal 
proceedings” (Secretary Napolitano).  As with most ICE memoranda, this directive did 
not dictate a full departure from old practices.  The memo discouraged low-priority 
arrests, but did not enforce it among its officers, effectively making it a suggestion than a 
hard rule of policy.  
Traditionally 287(g) has two kinds of agreements, task force and jail enforcement.  
The task force program allows officers to interrogate individuals in the field while the jail 
enforcement program only allows immigration interrogation to take place after an 
individual has already been arrested and detained for a local or state crime.  However, jail 
enforcement programs do not necessarily preclude officers from making arrests primarily 
on suspicion of immigration status, or more accurately, for personal motives.  For 
instance, all an officer needs to do is follow a person suspected to be an undocumented 
immigrant in the car for as long as possible until the driver does not make a complete 
stop at a stop sign, slightly exceeds the speed limit, or commits some other arbitrary 
offense.  The officer can use their discretion as rationale for placing the individual into 
custody.  The heavy criticism against 287(g) in recent years has lead to several 
investigations into its operations.  The findings of the studies cover various topics 
including racial profiling, civil rights violations, selective enforcement of the law, the 
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program’s impact on community safety, cost to local law enforcement, and the levels of 
federal oversight.  Some of the most important findings are: 
 The Department of Justice (DOJ) found that 287(g) participating municipality, 
Maricopa County, AZ, routinely engaged in unconstitutional policing 
practices and in racial profiling of Latinos that included unlawful stops, 
detentions, and arrests of Latinos.  Furthermore, the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), a jail-only enforcement program of 287(g), 
regularly conducted “sweeps” in the community.  In parts of the county Latino 
drivers were nine times more likely to be stopped than non-Latino drivers 
(Perez). 
 In 2006-07, MSCO arrested 578 undocumented immigrants through traffic 
stops.  Of those, 498 of them received a single charge: conspiracy to smuggle 
themselves.  Since participating in 287(g), Maricopa County 9-1-1 call 
response times have increased (Gabrielson). 
 Another DOJ investigation discovered that the Almance County Sheriff’s 
Office in North Carolina, a jail enforcement only jurisdiction, also engaged in 
unconstitutional detentions and arrests.  In Almance County the local police 
erected check points at entrances to Latino neighborhoods.  The report 
described how Latinos were arrested for traffic violations that only resulted in 
citations for others and were ten times more likely to be pulled over than non-
Latinos (Perez). 
 The Brookings Institution reported on the additional costs of the program to 
local law enforcement and found that Prince William County, VA spent $6.4 
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million to run 287(g) in its first year and had to raise property taxes and draw 
from the county budget to cover the costs (“The 287(g)”). 
 The findings of a University of North Carolina report show that in a majority 
of cases, North Carolina 287(g) jurisdictions arrested and detained individuals 
who posed no threat to public safety.  For example, in May 2008 in Gaston 
Country, NC (another jail enforcement only jurisdiction) 83% of arrests made 
pursuant to 287(g) were for traffic violations (Wiessman).  Another UNC 
report chronicles how a Latino gunshot victim called the police for help and 
was arrested and deported for giving the wrong address of the crime scene.  A 
few months later five Latino men were deported after being arrested for 
fishing without a license (Nguyen). 
 The Government Accountability Office concluded that 287(g) suffers from a 
grave lack of oversight. ICE is partly to blame for abuses of authority under 
287(g) due to their lack of clearly defined program goals and for not 
adequately supervising the local law enforcement agencies (United States). 
 A report by the research group Justice Strategies found that 87% of 
jurisdictions participating in 287(g) had a higher-than-normal Latino 
population growth rate (“Local Democracy”). 
These studies clearly indicate abuses of authority and racial profiling (although not all 
287(g) programs operate unlawfully).  These findings should not be too surprising.  The 
program offers unsupervised authority to enforce the federal immigration laws but gives 
no compensation for the unrecuperated time and financial costs of said enforcement.  The 
only motivation to participate in the program seems to be the extra authority to locally 
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enforce national immigration laws, which is already done by the federal government.  
Who do you expect to sign up?  It should not be surprising that this program begot 
practices of unlawful detentions and arrests.  It has basically served as a free pass for 
those who aim to rid their communities of the foreign-born population.  Still, potential 
financial motivators for municipalities exist, although it is impossible to determine 
whether – and how much – they influence detention contracting with municipal 
governments.  These economic motivators can include donations or campaign 
contributions from prison corporations, or even a promise from one of the companies to 
open a new facility in the local area – a huge source of jobs and a boost to many political 
resumes.  
 
 
No matter the reasons municipalities have for participating in the program, 287(g) is 
unmistakably a boon for privately owned detention facilities by providing another 
Figure 9           Source: www.migrationpolicy.org (see Mendelson) 
Data from 2003-2008 shows that Fugitive Operations Programs predominantly apprehended non-
criminals. 
Fugitive Operations Team Apprehensions,  
Mid 2003 – February 2008 
  Irving 47  
enforcement mechanism for detaining immigrants.  With traffic stops used to detain and 
deport non-citizens, there is an almost inexhaustible pool of potential detainees. As 
Kenneth Smith, special agent in charge of ICE’s Atlanta office said, the program “would 
not necessarily have a huge impact on the criminal system,” but that “it certainly would 
on our detention and removal capabilities” (Smith). 
 At any time, either party of a 287(g) agreement can choose to withdraw from it.  
In some cases the agreements simply expire and are not renewed.  The Obama 
administration has reined in the use of 287(g) programs, allowing all of the task force 
agreements to expire at the end of 2012.  Currently, there are 36 active 287(g) agreements 
operating in 19 states across the country, all of which are jail enforcement only programs 
(“Fact Sheet”) down from the 69 active agreements in 2011 (“The Performance”).  These 
include one active jurisdiction in Colorado, El Paso County, home to Colorado Springs.  
The reason for the phase-out of the program is twofold.  Not only are the legality and 
ethics of the program under scrutiny, but the program is now widely considered obsolete 
in immigration enforcement circles, with deference given to another program, Secure 
Communities. 
The Secure Communities program also functions through cooperation between 
local and state law enforcement and Department of Homeland Security.  For years, when 
local jurisdictions have taken custody of an individual, their fingerprints get sent to the 
FBI to get crosschecked against criminal databases in order to see if they have a previous 
criminal record.  Under Secure Communities the local authorities still submit the 
fingerprints as normal, but when the FBI receives fingerprints they also send them to the 
DHS to check against immigration databases.  This program allows ICE to identify 
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individuals who are deportable either on criminal grounds or because of immigration 
status.  Unlike 287(g) in which local authorities have the power to conduct the 
immigration screenings, Secure Communities preserves the control of the federal 
immigration law with the federal government.  It also does not add an extra burden of 
enforcement nor extra costs to local enforcement agencies the way that 287(g) programs 
can do, but it does require extra costs from the local municipality when there is a 
database match and ICE issues an immigration detainer asking that an individual remain 
in local custody for an extra 48 hours.   
The Secure Communities program was created in 2008, at which point it 
underwent a probationary period in 14 volunteer pilot jurisdictions.  The Obama 
administration has rapidly expanded the scope of the program and as of January 2013, 
Secure Communities database sharing is active in all 3,181 local law enforcement 
jurisdictions in all U.S. states, territories, and Washington D.C. (“Secure Communities 
Activated”).  Through May 2013 the program had identified and removed over 279,00 
individuals to date (“Secure Communities Monthly”), with arrest numbers increasing 
annually.   
With the program’s authority reaching the entire U.S., concerns from its critics 
have grown.  Questions about its efficacy, legality, and unintended consequences have 
been best addressed in a comprehensive report published in 2011 by the UC Berkeley 
Law School’s Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy, with some very surprising 
findings (see Kohli): 
 Approximately 3,600 United States citizens have been wrongfully detained by 
ICE as a result of the Secure Communities Program. 
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 More than one-third of arrestees reported having a U.S. citizen spouse or 
child, meaning that around 88,000 families with U.S. citizen members have 
been affected by the program. 
 Only 52% of all detainees identified by the program are scheduled to have a 
hearing in front of an immigration judge.  This statistic is the product of 
speedy, informal removals which will be discussed in the next section of this 
paper. 
 As of mid-2011, 93% of the program’s undocumented immigrant arrests were 
of Latinos even though they only comprise 77% of the undocumented 
population. 
 Of all deportable individuals identified by the program, 83% are placed into 
ICE detention compared to an overall DHS immigration detention rate of 
62%. 
In a brochure about the program, ICE claims that Secure Communities “prioritizes the 
removal of criminal aliens by focusing efforts on the most dangerous and violent 
offenders” (“Secure Communities A Modernized”). Secure Communities uses a 
classification system to rank the severity of crimes that detainees have been accused of 
committing.  In literature disseminated to state and local authorities, the DHS describes 
the different levels as (see “Immigration and”): 
For SC purposes, Level 1 offenses include the following state or federal crimes: 
national security violations, homicide, kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, 
aggravated assault, threats of bodily harm, extortion or threat to injure a person, 
sex offenses, cruelty toward child or spouse, resisting an officer, weapons 
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violations, hit and run involving injury or death, and drug offenses involving a 
sentencing to a term of imprisonment greater than one year. Level 2 offenses are 
primarily property crimes and Level 3 offenses are other crimes, primarily 
misdemeanors. 
Notably, Level 2 offenses also include all drug-related crimes that result in prison 
sentences of less than one year.  If ICE and Secure Communities prioritize violent and 
dangerous criminals, a majority of their deportations should involve Level 1 offenders.  
However, ICE statistics show a practice that is much different from what they preach. To 
date only 29.3% of deportations under Secure Communities have been Level 1 offenders 
(“Secure Communities Monthly”).  Meanwhile the least dangerous individuals, including 
all non-criminal immigration offenders and Level 3 criminal offenders (crimes which do 
not cause deportation for those with legal immigration status) make up 52% of 
deportations under Secure Communities (“Secure Communities Monthly”). Of the total, 
22% of deported people had no criminal convictions whatsoever (“Secure Communities 
Monthly”). 
Recently ICE has touted the use of prosecutorial discretion in whom it targets for 
removal.  An internal memo especially cautioned against detaining or deporting witnesses 
of crimes (Morton, “Prosecutorial”). However, Secure Communities undermines the 
proclamation of discretion that would prioritize dangerous criminal aliens because it 
reviews every single individual booked into custody with automatic database alerts for 
even the tiniest blip in the records.  Although ICE claims on its website that it considers a 
“number of different factors” in deciding whether to release or deport an alien, the 
statistics show a different story.  The high numbers of non-violent and non-criminal 
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deportations indicate a blind willingness to deport as many people as possible, with little 
to no discretion in the process.  Like 287(g), Secure Communities lacks clearly defined 
goals and guidelines, as well as the proper oversight and accountability to make sure that 
it operates as directed.  It can also levy hidden costs on local enforcement agencies if 
knowledge of the program leads officers to make a higher number of arrests in hopes of 
catching a deportable immigrant.
20
  
President Obama is trying to put a more liberal spin on the Republican 
immigration enforcement mandate.  In practice, however, the bed mandate remains 
enforced while the Obama Administration’s directives to focus on violent, dangerous 
aliens are not.  In a world of political score keeping, the Republican party is winning on 
immigration enforcement. 
 
Part Four: (Lack of) Protections Against  
Arbitrary, Wrongful, and Indefinite Detentions 
As a rule, ICE places people who are suspected of being deportable into 
immigration detention.
21
  Immigration detention is not used in place of traditional prison 
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 I could not find hard statistics on the overall arrest rate under Secure Communities although there is 
evidence of high numbers of non-criminal arrests which likely result in a higher arrest rate overall.  
21
 In addition to deportations, Customs and Border Patrol (not Immigration and Customs Enforcement) also 
expels people from the country in a process that is rarely discussed: voluntary departure, sometimes called 
“returns” by the DHS.  Voluntary departures are agreements in which individuals agree to remove 
themselves from the country within a certain period of time, facing a fine up to $5,000 and 10-year ban 
from the country if they fail to do so.
21
  This type of deformalized removal governs more than 1 million 
cases every year.
21
  For many, it is a good deal because it does not forcibly bar them from reentering the 
country in the future and it allows them to return to their country of origin on their own terms.  However, 
this means they must bear the cost and responsibility of exiting the country.  In some cases this can be 
challenging, but most voluntary departures happen right at the border after coming into contact with a 
Customs and Border Protection official, and a majority of these occur at the Southwest Border, between the 
U.S. and Mexico.  In these most common cases, an individual essentially turns around and walks back 
across the border.  Voluntary removals are usually (not always) simply stopping someone from entering 
into the United States, not removing them from within the interior of the country. 
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or jailing facilities; it is its own system.  It exists for the purposes of enforcing 
immigration law and detains both criminal and non-criminal deportable individuals.  For 
criminal aliens, they undergo criminal trials and any punishments and are sent to 
immigration detention directly after serving any prison time.  Even though they have paid 
their entire debt to society, they are not allowed freed after their punishment. As 
mentioned in earlier sections, detentions do not always align with enforcement priorities 
and are sometimes unlawful.  This section describes the options available for immigrants 
to challenge their detentions and deportation orders. 
 
4.1 Classifications: A Non-Punitive Administrative Measure 
 and Seeking Entry  
The U.S. government does not consider immigration detention or deportation to 
be punishment.  Instead it views immigration detention as part of an administrative 
procedure (to prevent individuals from escaping deportation proceedings) that is not 
punitive in nature, despite the fact that some immigration facilities double as traditional 
prisons, house prisoners and immigrants in the same conditions, and/or are operated by 
corporations that specialize in private prisons.  Since detainees are placed in detention 
and not technically in prison, they are not guaranteed the constitutional and due process 
protections that are required in criminal proceedings.  After an immigrant has been 
detained, the non-citizen has far fewer recourses to remedy or appeal the situation than if 
they had been sentenced to prison.  Because of the non-punishment classification of 
detention and the civil-not-criminal nature of deportation proceedings, hundreds of 
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thousands of individuals every year are denied due process and subject to inhumane 
detention within the United States. 
While immigrants who are documented and undocumented, criminal and non-
criminal, are placed in immigration detention, migrants who crossed the border without 
any inspection receive an especially harmful classification under U.S. law.  These 
individuals have never “made a legitimate entry into the U.S.” and are therefore “treated 
extra-territorially as subjects standing at U.S. border points of entry” (Coleman).  They 
are classified as seeking entry to the United States, are not considered a person within the 
United States (Golash-Boza, 6), and are thus entitled to the least amount of constitutional 
protections of any alien.  Since the person was never screened by a U.S. border patrol 
agent, the law sees them as potentially inadmissible persons, even if they already 
permanently reside in the U.S.  Those considered to be seeking admission to the U.S. 
(even if they live here) may be subject to mandatory detention and expedited removals. 
 
4.2 Non-Formalized Removals: Expedited Removals, Administrative Removals, 
and Stipulated Orders of Removal 
Expedited removals are deportation orders that can be carried out by immigration 
officers without any judicial review, as opposed to a removal of a non-citizen who is 
deemed eligible for deportation (i.e., has a legal presence in the country that has expired 
or been revoked) who has the right to a hearing before an immigration judge.
22
  When 
expedited removals were first instituted in 1997, the Department of Justice said that 
expedited removals would only be applied to “arriving aliens at ports of entry” 
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 There are other due process denials committed against immigrants besides lack of the right judicial 
review, as will be discussed late in this section, and even those who have a right to an immigration hearing 
often never exercise it. 
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(Kanstroom, 104).  The expedited removal territory has since expanded to all areas within 
100 miles of the border.  In order to avoid being subjected to expedited removal, a non-
citizen must prove that they have been in the country for at least two years, have legal 
immigration status, or have a legitimate claim of asylum (Grable).  This system itself is 
dangerous because it places the burden of proof on the victim, not on the authorities, and 
does not allow appeals.  This completely flips the traditions of U.S. jurisprudence, 
effectively creating a system that operates on the concept of guilty (and jailed) until 
proven innocent. 
The system that is in place, with its few safeguards, is not administered correctly.  
The bipartisan United States Commission of International Religious Freedom published a 
report detailing expedited removals of genuine asylum seekers in which it found repeated 
failures to ask necessary questions that are designed to legitimize claims of asylum and 
frequent factual and legal errors (U.S. Commission). Expert analysis of expedited 
removals revealed that within its first decade of use, expedited removals wrongly denied 
entry to some 20,000 genuine asylum seekers (Pistone). This is one of the most 
misguided and deplorable aspects of the broken immigration system that, but this portion 
hardly makes headlines.  When people arrive in our country fleeing violence and 
persecution, our country’s policy is to detain all of them until a decision can be rendered 
on whether or not to allow them entry.  The government puts refuge seekers in mandatory 
detention, regularly for up to three months at a time (Kerwin); it is their first welcome to 
their new lives in the country that prides itself on an uncompromising adherence to 
freedom.   
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In other cases non-citizens who violate their immigration status through an 
aggravated felony conviction are subjected to administrative removal.  In administrative 
removals, individuals are also not granted immigration hearings but they do have the 
right to appeal their deportation.  But just like expedited removals, there is no judicial 
review or discretion to determine whether the deportation has been ordered justly and 
morally.  
Within a detention center, many detainees are unaware of their rights.  All 
immigrants have the right to an immigration hearing in front of a judge except for those 
who have previously been ordered deported.  However, many of them are not informed of 
this right or end up signing it away as a result of coercion or confusion.  There are 
volunteer groups like Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network in Denver that go 
to detention centers to inform detainees about their rights, but these groups cannot reach 
everyone and are already hindered in their mission because they rely heavily on part-time 
volunteers.  As a result of detainees’ ignorance of their rights, in any given year 
thousands of them waive their procedural rights and sign stipulated orders of removal, as 
a sort of immigration plea-bargain (Kanstroom, 66).  As a part of these agreements, 
detainees agree to be deported without having a hearing in front of an immigration judge.  
Alternatively, they can choose to remain in detention indefinitely while fighting their 
case.  Between 2004 and 2007, stipulated orders of removal increased six-fold, from 
5,000 to 30,000 (Backgrounder) and totaled over 160,000 removals as of mid-2011 
(Koh).  Even though signing such a waiver of rights is required to be “voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent” (8 C.F.R. §1003.25[b]), there are problems with lack of proper 
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translation, intimidation, and deliberate misinformation by deportation officials who may 
sometimes present such waivers as routine paperwork (“Language Barriers”). 
Throughout the entire deportation appeals process, no matter what type of 
removal or the person’s immigration status, the person is usually detained.  The appeals 
process, and accompanying detention, can last for years.  In some cases individuals are 
eligible for bond, although even fewer of them realize it.  Of those who are granted bond, 
many of them are also unaware that they can request to have their bond amount lowered 
if they believe it has been set too high.  In many cases though, such as when a person is 
considered (usually subjectively) a flight risk or is subject to mandatory detention by law, 
they are not allowed the privilege of bail.  Bond is forbidden for about two-thirds of 
detainees (Secretary Chertoff). 
 
4.3 Length of Detention 
For those removed from within the country, time spent in detention often extends 
beyond just the standard deportation process.  The average detention length for an 
immigrant in ICE detention is around 37 days (“Alien Detention”), although this number 
is skewed low because of the high numbers of expedited removals and stipulated orders 
of removal.  Even though there is a 90-day maximum
23
 detention period for normal 
deportation proceedings (unless deportation is imminent at 90 days), that limit is 
inapplicable if an individual appeals their removal or is an asylum seeker. It is not 
uncommon for a person to spend multiple years in detention.  At any given time at least 
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 By not prioritizing enforcement, truly dangerous individuals may be released from detention if not 
deported within 90 days.  Budget cuts also prompt detainee releases.  ICE released about 2,000 immigrant 
detainees in early 2013 in advance of the sequester (“Obama Administration”). 
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2,100 detainees have been held in immigration detention for more than one year, with no 
clear end in sight (Kanstroom, 122).  Most of these detentions are wrongful in the first 
place as has been previously discussed, and almost all last far too long.  It is impossible 
to say how many of these people appeal their deportations for fear of being killed or 
tortured if they return to their country of origin, or because they potentially face 
irrevocable separation from their families and/or livelihoods in the U.S.   
This crisis is so harmful not only due to poor detention conditions,
24
 but also 
because the deportation appeals process is so long. As if facing exile from their country 
of residence wasn’t enough, some immigrant detainees spend years in detention and 
thousands of dollars to appeal their removal order.   The slow speed at which immigration 
cases are processes is largely due to judicial backlog, which also occurs for initial 
immigration hearings but is especially a problem for immigration appeals.  Currently 
there are only 254 immigration judges to hear over 300,000 pending immigration cases 
(Volpe). 
 
4.4 Lack of Due Process Protections 
Throughout this drawn-out detention process, there are nine key ways that the 
normative due process rights of immigrants are denied, all of which are protected
25
 in 
criminal law proceedings: 
                                                 
24
 The alleged human rights abuse that take place in these facilities include emotional and sexual abuse, 
unexplained deaths, denied access to healthcare, and "individuals being thrown against walls by guards."
24
 
 
25
 In criminal procedure, due process protections are protected for all people, regardless of immigration 
status.  For example, The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection guarantees  
extend to all "persons." The rights attaching to criminal trials, including the right to a public trial, a trial by 
jury, the assistance of a lawyer, and the right to confront adverse witnesses, all apply to "the accused." And 
both the First Amendment's protections of political and religious freedoms and the Fourth Amendment's  
protection of privacy and liberty apply to "the people" (Cole). 
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 Arriving aliens, including asylum seekers and undocumented resident aliens 
classified as seeking entry, as well as aggravated felons, are automatically denied 
an immigration bond.  This leaves many innocent people languishing in detention, 
including aggravated felons who have already served out the entire prison 
sentence for their crime. 
 Since deportation and immigration detention are civil procedures, there is no right 
to a jury trial to decide on the life-shattering actions of deportation or indefinite 
detention. 
 With such high numbers of administrative removals, expedited removals, and 
stipulated orders of removal, judicial review and discretion is often non-existent 
in the process.  Furthermore, immigration judges are technically part of the 
Department of Justice and are therefore part of the executive branch, contrary to 
the free-from-influence nature of judges who are supposed to operate 
independently of the Executive and Legislative branches of the government. 
 The Ex Post Facto provision of the Constitution does not apply, meaning that 
following the passage of new laws, people can be retroactively deported for past 
offenses that were not grounds for deportation when they were committed.  
 There is no right to an appointed counsel in immigration court.  Although the 
defendants have the right to counsel, they must pay the high costs themselves. 
 The Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply, meaning that 
any and all evidence is admissible in immigration proceedings with no regard to 
the legality of how it was obtained (Golash-Boza, 24). 
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 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments does 
not apply since neither detention nor deportation is considered “punishment” 
(Golash-Boza, 24). 
 Immigrants detained without a warrant are not required to be informed of their 
rights until official deportation proceedings have been started against them 
(Mendoza). This policy leaves open a wide window, from first contact with law 
enforcement or ICE agents until the formal filing of a deportation order, for an 
individual to surrender incriminating information without knowledge of their right 
to remain silent, or knowing that such information can be used as evidence against 
them. 
 Similarly, there is no protection against self-incrimination as protected by the 
Fifth Amendment since deportation procedures is a civil proceeding.  
 
In 2003, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the constitutionality of detention 
during removal proceedings in Denmore v. Kim.  The court ruled 5-4 that “the 
Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period 
necessary for their removal proceedings” partly because deportation proceedings “are 
typically not lengthy” (Golash-Boza, 15-16). In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that 
non-citizens are persons before the law and should be afforded due process, reminding us 
that in our society “liberty is the norm” (Golash-Boza, 16).  His dissent is essentially not 
applicable for those immigrants classified as seeking entry into our country; they are not 
considered to be persons before the law.  The Supreme Court majority opinion in this 
case relies on the assertion that detentions typically do not last very long, although there 
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are many cases in which detention ends up as essentially indefinite while submitting 
individuals to inhumane conditions.  
The majority of these due process denials listed above are deemed permissible 
because of the civil nature of deportation proceedings and the non-punitive 
characterization of detention and deportation.  Because of how it has been categorized, 
even though deportation procedure denies normative due process protections, it operates 
within its legal bounds. The question then becomes whether or not detention and 
deportation have been properly classified, and it looks as though neither has.  
Deportations and their accompanying detentions should be adjudicated under criminal 
law procedure since criminal law governs cases in which the government is the plaintiff 
and an individual who has disobeyed a law is the defendant.  The United States defends 
the informal removals, civil administrative actions, as necessary, “largely because 
pursuing criminal charges in all cases would place a heavy burden upon prosecutorial 
resources and detention facilities” (Garcia).  This is not a legal, logical, or ethical 
argument.  According to this line of reasoning, informal removals that operate outside of 
judicial review or opportunity for appeal are used because they save money.  
Additionally, detention is punishment; it deprives people of their freedoms almost exactly 
as prison does.  Deportation is also punishment, seeing as it forcibly removes people from 
their homes, jobs, and families, and in some cases sends them to distant nations that they 
may not have known since birth and where they may not speak the language.  The law 
should embrace what is common sense; governments have used the exact practice as 
punishment for centuries under a different name: banishment.  There is a calamitous lack 
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of due process afforded to immigrants who enter detention, causing thousands of people 
to languish apart from their families in prison-like detention. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Enumerated and explained here are 11 policy recommendations that would force 
immigration enforcement to be more narrowly tailored and get rid of overly lengthy 
immigrant detentions and their related due process violations: 
1. Change the classification of detention and deportation so that they are officially 
considered forms of punishment.  This would necessitate that deportation 
proceedings move from civil into criminal law, extending due process rights of 
criminal procedure to people in deportation proceedings.  Some pundits in the 
immigration discourse deny that immigrants, especially undocumented 
immigrants, are entitled to such rights.  But as the ACLU explains, “The 
fundamental constitutional protections of due process and equal protection 
embodied in our Constitution and Bill of Rights apply to every “person” and are 
not limited to citizens” (“Immigrants’ Rights”).  If detention and deportation were 
correctly classified in accordance with their real-world implications, immigrants 
in deportation proceedings would receive the proper due process protections that 
they deserve.  Federal criminal procedure requires a jury trial only in cases in 
which the defendant faces a punishment of six months or more of incarceration.  
Therefore, there would not be an extra burden on the government to furnish juries 
in addition to judges for deportation proceedings since the punishment does not 
require it.   
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2. If Recommendation 1 is implemented, then the law should be amended so that 
immigration violations such as illegal reentry are only punishable with 
deportation, not imprisonment.  This in itself will not cut down on the number of 
people or amount of time spent in detention, but it would drastically reduce the 
overall time that many immigration offenders spend in prison-like facilities.  Our 
government does not need to imprison someone for several years because they 
returned to the United States after having been previously removed; it serves no 
compelling national security or public safety interest.  Other non-immigration 
crimes, especially violent ones, should remain punishable with prison as 
stipulated by statute.  One objection to this policy might be that without an 
increased penalty for second offenses, there is nothing that will discourage repeat 
immigration offenders.  That strategy, however, does not necessarily line up with 
immigration enforcement priorities, as it automatically punishes many people who 
had legitimate reasons for returning to the U.S., such as reuniting with family.  
Dangerous and violent criminals who commit crimes will face a criminal trial in 
front of a judge and with a right to a jury, which provides an opportunity for 
discretion in levying the harshest possible penalties when they are necessary. 
3. Diminish the maximum bed capacity for immigration detention to the lowest 
possible number necessary for national security as determined by the 
Congressional Research Service, and accordingly repeal the “bed mandate” and 
reduce ICE funding to levels commensurate with the new detention capacity.  
Ideally this number is 10,000 beds or less.  By cutting the numbers of detainees, 
ICE would have to strictly prioritize whom it detains, leading to fewer 
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unnecessary, wrongful detentions.  Perhaps more importantly for the future, under 
this change privately contracted beds should be the first ones cut, meaning that as 
long as the new number remains less than 17,000 (which it reasonably would), 
private prison corporations would lose their vested interest in policy making 
relevant to immigration detention.  This change would have an ancillary positive 
impact on human rights abuses inside the centers, since half of the ten most 
abusive detention centers are privately owned and/or operated, and the other half 
are contracted through local municipalities (Ray).  To more assuredly exclude 
prison corporation influence, the lower detention capacity could include a 
mandate that all detention facilities must be government owned (although this 
provision would be very difficult to pass politically).   
4. In conjunction with the lower detainee capacity, implement detention alternatives 
such electronic monitoring, probation, in-person reporting, or even consistent but 
random phone check-ins (similar to the random “color-line” scheduling of many 
drug court urine tests).  Alternative methods are sufficient for non-dangerous 
detainees; they can assure that individuals show up for their hearings, but do so in 
a much more humane manner.  Furthermore, alternatives can cost between 17 
cents and $17 dollars per person per day, and even if the most expensive methods 
were used in place of detention on all non-violent offenders, the DHS could save 
$1.44 billion annually (The Math). 
5. Do away with the “seeking entry” classification of people who have never made a 
formalized border crossing into the United States.  Instead, reclassify the same 
group of people as “seeking legal entry,” thus acknowledging their presence in the 
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country and status as a person before U.S. law.  This would afford them most of 
the same fundamental civil rights protections as immigrants with legal status, but 
still acknowledge that they do not yet have the legal right to be present inside the 
country. 
6. Ban expedited removals, administrative removals, and stipulated orders of 
removal.  These forms of informal removal have been argued as necessary to the 
efficiency of immigration control since they take very little time to complete in 
comparison to normal deportation proceedings.  According to Mark Fleming, 
litigation coordinator for the National Immigrant Justice Center, “You have a 
massive backlog, and the most efficient way for [ICE] to meet its goal is to 
remove these folks through [informal deportations]” (Zamudio).  However, with 
more judges (see #7, below) cases can move more quickly through the system and 
still be heard by an immigration judge.  Doing away with these types of informal 
removals means that people cannot be confused or coerced into signing away their 
due process rights and unknowingly agreeing to deportation.  Each case might 
take longer, but hiring more judges can mitigate any judicial backup by 
processing more cases at any one time.  
7. Increase the number of immigration judges and the number of Bureau of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) judges.  Immigration judges handle regular hearings 
in immigration court whereas the BIA makes binding decisions on immigration 
court appeals. The increased personnel in this case would restore judicial review 
and discretion by allowing all persons under deportation proceedings to have a 
hearing in front of a judge.  It would also decrease detention times by shortening 
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the time it takes to process immigration court appeals. There would be an inherent 
cost in hiring more judges, although that cost is potentially offset by lowering the 
amount of time that the Department of Homeland Security must pay to detain 
immigrants.  It is hard to refute the hiring of more judges as cost-prohibitive, as 
their presence (for the purposes of protecting civil rights and national interest) 
would be a negligible portion of the United States federal budget.  
8. Give immigration judges the authority to use their discretion to override 
mandatory removals, such as those resulting from certain criminal convictions 
and other violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  This would aid in 
keeping families together and would stop the blind deportations of many people 
who have a real and honest claim to life in the U.S.  
9. Increase the number of temporary work visas in order to increase the flow of low-
skill, temporary workers back and forth across the border, especially the border 
with Mexico.  As it stands now, the relatively low number of temporary visas 
available for low-skilled workers combined with intense border security 
incentivizes workers to remain in the U.S. illegally.  The odds of receiving a work 
visa (or a visa renewal) are so low and the risks of an unsanctioned border 
crossing are so high, that many people choose to remain in the U.S. and bring 
their families here instead of returning home after their work period.  Currently 
the U.S. grants about 110,000 H2 visas every year for the temporary admittance 
of low skilled workers (“Multi-Year”). The proposed immigration overhaul in the 
Senate would create a new class of visas for low skilled temporary workers called 
W-visas.  The United States Chamber of Commerce initially requested that 
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400,000 W-visas be granted annually (Nakamura).  As it was passed by the 
Senate, the proposal only offers 20,000 W-visas in the first year, increasing 
annually to 75,000 in the fourth year and creates the Bureau of Immigration and 
Market Research to set visa numbers in the future (Border Security). 
10. Create a new ICE division specifically in charge of monitoring immigration 
enforcement and detention to give the agency closer and more accurate oversight.  
The division should have two primary functions: to keep thorough, accurate, and 
accessible statistics on the detainee population, and to monitor and enforce 
humane living conditions and treatment inside detention facilities.  Their 
monitoring there should provide better information about where and when 
wrongful detentions and human rights violations occur.  I recommend that the 
division adhere to the United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, of which there have 
already been many documented violations within detention centers.  The new 
division should present an annual report to the directors of ICE, Customs and 
Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as make it 
publicly accessible.  The information provided by the division can be used as the 
basis for corrective administrative actions such as dismissing personnel and 
levying fines against contracted facilities or municipalities for failing to uphold 
proper standards of treatment.  Under this scrutiny and with a judicial system that 
allows for discretion, the Criminal Alien Program and Secure Communities 
should continue to function (287[g] seems superfluous) since in some cases they 
play an integral role in deporting truly dangerous criminals. 
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11. Allow full access and transparency for journalists inside detention centers.  This 
includes allowing the operation of recording equipment inside the facilities and 
private access to detainees, away from the sight and hearing of guards or other 
facility personnel.  Perhaps the most fundamental step in solving a problem is 
exposing it to the public.   
One piece of ancillary advice should be included with these recommendations, even 
though it does not directly address immigration detention: do not increase border security 
measures.  Most scholars have widely discredited border security as ineffective for 
stopping the flow of immigration, including Suffolk University Scholar-in-Residence 
James Carroll who writes that the Southern border “should not be sealed…Razor wire 
and drones are not remotely part of the answer” (Carroll). If there is opportunity in our 
country, people will find their way to it.  Unfortunately, the political process has 
incorporated additional border security in the Senate’s proposed immigration overhaul, 
including $7.5 billion over the first five years that is required to be spent only on fencing 
(Carroll).  
In addition to policy recommendations, cultural shifts are fundamental to 
inspiring political change.  Nothing happens in politics if it is not instigated by an outside 
force, whether that force is campaign contributions, a pressing public need, or constituent 
pressure.  Changing attitudes and minds on a large scale is much more nuanced and less 
concrete than proposing new laws and policies.  It starts at a young age and happens 
through education and conversation with family, friends, and people with opposite 
viewpoints.  Media plays a huge role in everyday life and has a capacity to reach people 
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like no other means available today.  But if public attitude does not demand it, the 
immigration detention system will not change. 
 
Conclusion 
This project sought to understand why our country has detained and deported 
record numbers of immigrants in recent years.  It found that privately owned prison 
corporations are primary beneficiaries of an enlarged detainee population and have 
expended large amounts of money and effort to pass laws that keep immigrants in 
detention. The Executive Branch of the United States Government justifies its actions by 
claiming that it focuses enforcement efforts on violent and dangerous “criminal aliens.”   
In most cases, the violent “criminal aliens” targeted by immigration enforcement are in 
fact not dangerous or violent, and often not criminal at all.  The programs that partner 
local law enforcement with the Department of Homeland Security to aid in identifying 
and deporting dangerous criminals suffer from rampant racial profiling and abuses of 
authority.  Their administration leads to the detention and deportation of many thousands 
of non-dangerous, non-violent individuals every year.  Furthermore, once immigrants are 
in detention, many of them are denied their due process rights to fight their captivity and 
deportation orders.  This civil rights denial is partly the result of a classification system 
that views persons within our national borders as seeking entry to the country and 
therefore not present under the law of the United States.  Denials of normative due 
process are also due to the definitions of detention and deportation as administrative 
actions instead of punitive in nature which aid in keeping detention and deportation 
proceedings within the realm of civil law, apart from the protections that govern criminal 
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procedure.  Some immigrants are also denied their due process because of coercion by 
law enforcement officers, confusion from inadequate translation services, or simply by 
not being informed of their rights.  
The work on this project has been limited by a lack of sufficient statistics, 
inconsistencies in data from different sources,
 26
 and a general shroud of secrecy 
surrounding immigration detention.  The first step for further fruitful research on this 
topic, and eventually for proper and lasting solutions, is to bring greater transparency and 
reliable record keeping to the immigration detention system.   One compelling option for 
future study is to further investigate the history, rationale, and legality of why deportation 
hearings are conducted as civil, rather than criminal, proceedings. 
This paper implicates a number of institutions, both public and private, in the 
criminalization of immigrants in the United States.  Every year immigration detention 
unnecessarily harms hundreds of thousands of detainees, and millions of their family 
members and friends.  The United States spends almost $2 billion a year on immigration 
detention even though cheaper, equally effective, and more humane alternatives exist.  
The current immigration detention system is a source of civil rights abuses and 
profiteering that operate under the guise of national security and compelling state interest. 
The historically high numbers of detentions and deportations are unnecessary and unjust, 
misleading to the public, and harmful to the human condition.   
 
 
                                                 
26
 Some sources were strongly biased or purposefully misrepresented information in order to reinforce their 
message.  When I encountered conflicts in data I used the most reputable source or, if there was not one 
clearly reliable source, I used the statistic that was most commonly found in other sources.  After gaining 
an in depth understanding of this topic, it was easier to identify incorrect and misleading information. 
  Irving 70  
Bibliography 
“Aggravated Felonies: An Overview." ImmigrationPolicy.org. American Immigration Council. Web. 
27 Oct. 2013. <http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/aggravated-felonies-
overview>. 
“Alien Detention Standards: Observations on the Adherence to ICE's Medical Standards in Detention 
Facilities.” US Government Accountability Office. 4 June 2008. 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08869t.pdf>. 
“America's Foreign Born in the Last 50 Years." Census.gov. United States Census Bureau. Web. 17 
Oct. 2013. <http://www.census.gov/how/infographics/foreign_born.html>. 
Anton, Jason D. "DEFINING “FOUND IN”: CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOVERY AND THE CRIME 
OF ILLEGAL REENTRY." Columbia Law Review 113 (2013): 1239-
282.ColumbiaLawReview.org. Columbia University Law School, 2013. Web. 13 
Oct. 2013. <http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Anton-
J.pdf>. 
“Architecture for Immigration Reform: Fitting the Pieces of Public Policy.” University of Denver - 
Strategic Issues Program, 2009. Web. 15 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.du.edu/issues/media/documents/2009IMMIGRATIONREPORT.pdf>.   
“ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES.” The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 13 
October 2013.<http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2011/2011_11_182%23sort=ideology>. 
Backgrounder: Stipulated Removal by Jayashri Srikantiah, Stanford Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, and 
Karen Tumlin, National Immigration Law Center.  Available at 
<http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/clinics/immigrantsrights/pressrelease/Stipulat
ed_removal_backgrounder.pdf>. 
Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong., 
GovTrack.us (2013). <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s744/text>. 
Caldwell, Beth. "Excluding 'criminals' from Comprehensive Immigration Reform."AlJazeera.com. Al 
Jazeera America, 13 May 2013. Web. 27 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/2013597332993575.html>. 
Capps, Randy, Marc R. Rosenblum, Cristina Rodríguez, and Muzaffar Chishti. "Delegation and 
Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration Enforcement." 
Washington, D.C. Migration Policy Institute. 
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf>. 
  Irving 71  
Carroll, James. "Sealing the Border Is Part of the Problem." BostonGlobe.com. BOSTON GLOBE 
MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC, 12 Aug. 2013. Web. 28 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/08/11/stop-pretending-more-border-
security-will-help/7FfbMzTVKBWUj6zPUwWXBO/story.html>. 
Cervantes-Gautschi, P. (2010). “Wall Street & Our Carnpaign to Decriminalize Immigrants.” Social 
Policy, 40(3), 3-5. 
Cole, David. "Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?" Thomas 
Jefferson Law Review 25 (2003): 367-88. GEORGETOWN LAW Faculty 
Publications. Web. 31 Oct. 2013. 
<http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1302&context=f
acpub>. 
Coleman, Matthew. 2007. “Immigration Geopolitics Beyond the Mexico/US Border.” Antipode 39.1: 
54-76. (February, 2007).  Available at 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2007.00506.x/abstract>. 
“Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality 
Act."CDPSweb.state.co.us. Colorado Department of Public Safety, 18 Aug. 2008. 
Web. 13 Oct. 2013. <http://cdpsweb.state.co.us/immigration/Meetings/October21/10-
21-08%20287%20Delegation%20of%20Authority.pdf>. 
“Denver Drug Court." DenverDA.org. District Attorney of Denver. Web. 19 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.denverda.org/Prosecution_Units/Drug_Court/Drug_Court.htm>. 
“Deportations by Fiscal Year." AmericasVoiceOnline.org. America's Voice. Web. 20 Oct. 2013. 
“Drug Courts: A Smart Approach to Criminal Justice." WhiteHouse.gov. Executive Office of the 
President, May 2011. Web. 27 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/drug_courts_fact_
sheet_5-31-11.pdf>. 
“Drug Law Violations Enforcement." BJS.gov. United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice 
Statistics. Web. 19 Oct. 2013. <http://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm>. 
“Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act." 
ICE.gov. United States Department of Homeland Security. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm>. 
Fairley, Elena, and Rich Jones. "Colorado's Undocumented Immigrants: What They Pay, What They 
Cost in Taxes." The Bell Policy Center. 22 Apr. 2011. 
<https://bellpolicy.org/sites/default/files/ImmigrationTaxesCost2011_3.pdf>. 
Fischer, Brendan. "U.S. Supreme Court Considers ALEC Immigration Bill." PRWatch.org. Center for 
Media and Democracy, 25 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
  Irving 72  
<http://www.prwatch.org/news/2012/04/11478/us-supreme-court-considers-alec-
immigration-bill>. 
“FY 2012 Budget in Brief." DHS.gov. United States Department of Homeland Security. Web. 29 Oct. 
2013. <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf>. 
Gabrielson, Ryan, and Paul Giblin. "Reasonable Doubt." EastValleyTribune.com. 10/13 
Communications, July 2008. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/special_reports/reasonable_doubt/>. 
Garcia, Michael J., and Kate M. Manuel. Authority of State and Local Police to Enforce Federal 
Immigration Law. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 17 Sept. 2010. Web. 31 
Oct. 2013. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/150177.pdf>. 
Golash-Boza, Tanya Maria. Due Process Denied: Detentions and Deportations in the United States. 
New York: Routledge, 2012. Print. 
Grable, David. 1997-98. “Personhood under the Due Process Clause: A Constitutional Analysis of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.” Cornell 
Law Review 83: 820-65.  Available at 
<http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Grable.pdf>. 
Greeley, Brendan. "ALEC's Secrets Revealed; Corporations Flee." BusinessWeek.com. Bloomberg 
Business Week, 03 May 2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-03/alecs-secrets-revealed-
corporations-flee>. 
Hansen, Kristin A., and Amara Bachu. The Foreign Born Population: 1994. Rep. no. P20-486. United 
States Census Bureau, Aug. 1995. Web. 17 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p20-486.pdf>. 
Harry S. Truman:"Veto of Bill To Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and 
Nationality.," June 25, 1952.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,The 
American Presidency Project. 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14175#axzz2j3jrfM7u>. 
Hodai, Beau. "Brownskins and Greenbacks: ALEC, the For-Profit Prison Industry and Arizona's SB 
1070." PRWatch.org. Center for Media and Democracy, 22 Aug. 2011. Web. 13 Oct. 
2013. <http://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/08/10947/brownskins-and-greenbacks-
alec-profit-prison-industry-and-arizona%E2%80%99s-sb-1070>. 
ICE, “Delegation of Immigration Authority, Section 287(g), Immigration and Nationality Act” (fact 
sheet, September 6, 2007). ICE regularly updates the fact sheet, and this older 
version is no longer available on the web. See: End Notes 70 and 72. 
  Irving 73  
“Immigrants' Rights." AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion.org. American Civil Liberties Union. Web. 22 
Oct. 2013. <https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights>. 
“Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Secure Communities (SC) Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP)." EPIC.org. Electronic Privacy Information Center. Web. 13 Oct. 
2013. 
<http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf>. 
“Immigration Detention." ACLU.org. American Civil Liberties Union. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/immigration-detention>. 
"Is Immigration Law Civil or Criminal?" Social Scientists on Immigration Policy: Is Immigration Law 
Civil or Criminal? Tanya Golash-Boza, University of California Merced, 01 Aug. 
2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2013. 
Johnston, David. "At Least 31 Are Dead, Scores Are Missing After Car Bomb Attack in Oklahoma 
City Wrecks 9-Story Federal Office Building." NYTimes.com. The New York Times 
Company, 19 Apr. 1995. Web. 26 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0419.html>. 
Kanstroom, Dan. Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora. Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2012. Print. 
Kerwin, Donald and Serena Yi-Ying Lin. 2009. “Immigrant Detention: Can ICE Meet its Legal 
Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities?” Migration Policy Institute. 
Retrieved October 21, 2013. 
<http://migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf>.
  
Kirkham, Chris. "Private Prisons Profit From Immigration Crackdown, Federal And Local Law 
Enforcement Partnerships." TheHuffingtonPost.com. The Huffington Post, 07 June 
2012. Web. 28 Oct. 2013. 
Koh, Jennifer L., Jayrashi Srikantiah, and Karen C. Tumlin. Deportation Without Due Process. Rep. 
National Immigration Law Center, Sept. 2011. Web. 21 Oct. 2013. 
<www.nilc.org/document.html?id=6>. 
Kohli, Aarti, Peter L. Markowitz, and Lisa Chavez. Law.Berkeley.edu. Rep. The Chief Justice Earl 
Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley Law 
School, Oct. 2011. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf>. 
“Language Barriers May Lead Immigrants to Waive Right to Hearing Before Deportation.” National 
Immigration Justice Center (June 3, 2008).  See 
<http://www.immigrantjustice.org/press_releases?new-data-suggests-language-
barriers-lead-immigrants-waive-right-hearing-deportation>. 
  Irving 74  
 Letter from “The Female Detainees,” Pinal County Jail, Florence, Arizona, to Christina Powers, 
Attorney, Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, January 2008 (reprinted 
in Human Rights Watch, Detained and Dismissed: Women’s Struggles to Obtain 
Health Care in United States Immigration Detention, Mar. 17, 2009), available at 
<http://hrw.org/reports/2009/03/16/detained-and-dismissed>. 
Lewis, Anthony. "With Exquisite Cruelty." New York Times 28 Feb. 1997, Opinion sec.: n. pag. The 
New York Times Company. Web. 16 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/28/opinion/with-exquisite-
cruelty.html?ref=anthonylewis>. 
“Local Democracy on ICE: Why State and Local Governments Have No Business in Federal 
Immigration Law Enforcement." JusticeStrategies.org. Tides Center, 27 Feb. 2009. 
Web. 13 Oct. 2013. <http://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2009/local-
democracy-ice-why-state-and-local-governments-have-no-business-federal-immig>. 
Males, Mike. "Are Immigration Detainer Practices Rational?" CJCJ.org. Center for Juvenile and 
Criminal Justice, Sept. 2013. Web. 31 Oct. 2013. 
Martinez Jr, Ramiro, and Matthew T. Lee. "On immigration and crime." Criminal justice 1.1 (2000): 
486-524. Available at < https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02j.pdf>. 
McIntire, Mike. "Conservative Nonprofit Acts as a Stealth Business Lobbyist."NYTimes.com. New 
York Times, 21 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/us/alec-a-tax-exempt-group-mixes-legislators-
and-lobbyists.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&>. 
Mendelson, Margot, Shayna Strom, and Michael Wishnie. "Collateral Damage: An Examination of 
ICE's Fugitive Operations Program." MigrationPolicy.org. Migration Policy 
Institute, Feb. 2009. Web. 24 Oct. 2013.  
Mendoza, Nicolas. "New Policy Says Non-citizens Don’t Need to Be Informed of Their Rights before 
Questioning." FloridaIndependent.com. The American Independent News Network, 
16 Aug. 2011. Web. 22 Oct. 2013. 
<http://floridaindependent.com/43936/immigration-rights>. 
Pistone, Michelle R. & John J. Hoeffner. 2006. Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the Process of 
Expedited Removals Fails Asylum Seekers, 203. Geo. Immigr. L.J. 
Miroff, Nick. "Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom."WashingtonPost.com. The 
Washington Post, 13 Oct. 2013. Web. 29 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-
detention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html>. 
  Irving 75  
Monahan, John, and Henry J. Steadman, eds. Violence and Mental Disorder: Developments in Risk 
Assessment. University of Chicago, 1996. Google Books. Web. 27 Oct. 2013. 
<http://books.google.cl/books?hl=es&lr=&id=v4oSb2Na4nQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA81&
dq=robert+hare+psychopathy+checklist&ots=iN5H-
8Ih4_&sig=TkG1TTvaf6C3wyF6js54nY2jBEs#v=onepage&q=robert%20hare%20p
sychopathy%20checklist&f=false>. 
Moore. Nonviolence or Non-Existence, 84. Print. From Dr. Cathy Comstock’s class, Literature and 
Social Violence. 
Morton, John. "MEMORANDUM FOR: All ICE Employees." ICE.gov. United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 02 Mar. 2011. Web. 27 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf>. 
Morton, John. "Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs." Letter to All 
Field Officers, All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel. 17 June 
2011.ICE.gov. United States Department of Homeland Security. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf>. 
“Multi-Year Graphs - Visas." State.gov. United States Department of State. Web. 25 Oct. 2013. 
<http://travel.state.gov/visa/statistics/graphs/graphs_4399.html>. 
Nakamura, David. "Chamber, Labor Unions at Odds over Guest Worker 
Program."Washington.Post.com. The Washington Post, 15 Mar. 2013. Web. 25 Oct. 
2013. <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-15/politics/37737044_1_guest-
worker-program-jobs-with-american-workers-group-of-eight-senators>. 
Nguyen, Mai Thi, and Hannah Gill. "The 287(g) Program: The Costs and Consequences of Local 
Immigration Enforcement in North Carolina Communities." Center for Global 
Initiatives Latino Migration Project. University of North Carolina, Feb. 2010. Web. 
13 Oct. 2013. <http://cgi.unc.edu/uploads/media_items/287g-report-
final.original.pdf>. 
Nichols, John. "The Koch Brothers, ALEC and the Savage Assault on Democracy."TheNation.com. 
The Nation, 11 Dec. 2011. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.thenation.com/blog/165077/koch-brothers-alec-and-savage-assault-
democracy>. 
Nofil, Brianna. "Detained Immigrants, Excludable Rights: The Strange Devolution of U.S. 
Immigration Authority, 1882-2012." Diss. Duke University, 2012. < 
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5878/Brianna_Nofil_T
hesisFinal.pdf?sequence=1>.  
  Irving 76  
“Obama Administration Acknowledges Thousands of Illegal Immigrants Released from 
Jails." Politico.com. Politico, 14 Mar. 2013. Web. 31 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/illegal-immigrants-released-88871.html>. 
Pendergraph, Jim. Testimony of the Sherriff of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy, and Human Resources, Empowering Local Law Enforcement to Combat 
Illegal Immigration, 109th Congress, 2nd sess., August 25, 2006, 
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg36029/pdf/CHRG-
109hhrg36029.pdf>. 
Perez, Thomas E. "Re: United States' Investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 
Office."Justice.gov. United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 15 
Dec. 2011. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf>. 
“President Obama: Close the 10 Worst Immigration Detention Facilities." ACLU.org. American Civil 
Liberties Union. Web. 04 Dec. 2012. <http://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrant-
rights/president-obama-close-10-worst-immigration-detention-facilities>. 
Proper, Emberson E. Colonial Immigration Laws: A Study of the Regulation of Immigration by the 
English Colonies in America. Columbia University, 1900. Books.Google.com. 
University of Michigan, 24 Nov. 2008. Web. 26 Oct. 2013. 
Ray, Tyler. "President Obama: Close the 10 Worst Immigration Detention Facilities." ACLU.org. 
American Civil Liberties Union, 29 Nov. 2012. 04 Dec. 2012. < 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/president-obama-close-10-worst-
immigration-detention-facilities>. 
“Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform in El Paso, 
Texas."WhiteHouse.gov. The White House, 10 May 2011. Web. 31 Oct. 2013. 
Reynolds, Sarnata. “Immigration Detention: The Golden Goose for Private Prisons.” 10 June 2011.  
<http://blog.amnestyusa.org/iar/immigration-detention-the-golden-goose-for-private-
prisons/>. 
Ronald Reagan, "Statement on United States Immigration and Refugee Policy ," July 30, 1981. 
<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/73081a.htm>. 
Secretary Chertoff Cites Border Security Progress During House Testimony, Statement for the 
Record, The Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary, United States Department of 
Homeland Security, Before the United States House of Representatives Committee 
on Homeland Security, July 17, 2008; available at 
  Irving 77  
<http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/congressional_test/chertoff_testimony.xml
>. 
“Secretary Napolitano Announces New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement 
Partnerships & Adds 11 New Agreements." DHS.gov. United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 10 July 2009. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/07/10/secretary-announces-new-agreement-state-
and-local-immigration-enforcement>. 
“Secure Communities A Modernized Approach to Identifying and Removing Criminal 
Aliens."ICE.gov. United States Department of Homeland Security, Jan. 2010. Web. 
13 Oct. 2013. <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-brochure.pdf>. 
“Secure Communities Activated Jurisdictions." ICE.gov. United States Department ofHomeland 
Security, 22 Jan. 2013. Web. 21 Oct. 2013. <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf>. 
“Secure Communities Monthly Statistics through May 31, 2013." ICE.gov. United States Department 
of Homeland Security. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-
stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2013-to-date.pdf>. 
Seitz-Wald, Alex. "Oops: Florida Republican Forgets To Remove ALEC Mission Statement From 
Boilerplate Anti-Tax Bill." ThinkProgress.org. Think Progress, 02 Feb. 2012. Web. 
13 Oct. 2013. <http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/02/02/417488/florida-gop-
alec-forget/?mobile=nc>. 
Selway, William. "Congress Mandates Jail Beds for 34,000 Immigrants as Private Prisons Profit." 
Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 24 Sept. 2013. Web. 29 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-24/congress-fuels-private-jails-
detaining-34-000-immigrants.html>. 
Shear, Michael D. "Seeing Citizenship Path Near, Activists Push Obama to Slow Deportations." 
NYTimes.com. The New York Times Company, 22 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/advocates-push-obama-to-halt-aggressive-
deportation-efforts.html>.  
Shierholz, Heidi. "The Economic Policy Institute." EPI.org. Economic Policy Institute, 04 Feb. 2010. 
Web. 30 Oct. 2013. <http://www.epi.org/publication/bp255/>. 
Simanski, John, and Lesley M. Sapp. "Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2011." DHS.gov. United 
States Department of Homeland Security, Sept. 2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-
statistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf>. 
  Irving 78  
Siskin, Alsion. "Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues." FAS.org. Congressional 
Research Service, 12 Jan. 2012. Web. 30 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32369.pdf>. 
Skerry, Peter. "Splitting the Difference on Illegal Immigration Publications National 
Affairs."NationalAffairs.com. National Affairs, Inc, Winter 2013. Web. 27 Oct. 
2013. <http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/splitting-the-difference-
on-illegal-immigration>. 
Smith, Kenneth A.  Testimony of the Special Agent in Charge, Atlanta, Georgia, Office of 
Investigations, ICE, before the House Committee on Government Reform, 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
Empowering Local Law Enforcement to Combat Illegal Immigration, 109th 
Congress, 2nd sess., August 25, 2006. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
109hhrg36029/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg36029.pdf>. 
Sullivan, Laura. "Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law." NPR.org. NPR, 28 Oct. 
2010. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. <http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-
economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law>. 
 “The 287(g) Program: A Flawed and Obsolete Method of Immigration 
Enforcement."ImmigrationPolicy.org. American Immigration Council, 29 Nov. 
2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. <http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/287g-
program-flawed-and-obsolete-method-immigration-enforcement>. 
“The Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Immigration Enforcement in Prisons and 
Jails."ImmigrationPolicy.org. Immigration Policy Center, 01 Aug. 2013. Web. 13 
Oct. 2013. <http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/criminal-alien-program-
cap-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails>. 
“The History of Immigration Detention in the U.S." Detention Watch Network. Adapted from “Voices 
from Detention: A Report on Human Rights Violations at the Northwest Detention 
Center,” Seattle University School of Law Human Rights Clinic and OneAmerica, 
July 2008, 2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381>. 
“The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention."DetentionWatchNetwork.org. 
Detention Watch Network, 2012. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons>. 
The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration Detention Do Not Add Up to 
Sensible Policies. Rep. National Immigration Forum, Aug. 2013. Web. 24 Oct. 2013. 
  Irving 79  
<http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetention.pd
f>. 
“The Performance of 287(g) Agreements FY 2011 Update." DHS.gov. United States Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Sept. 2011. Web. 21 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-119_Sep11.pdf>. 
“The United States of ALEC." Moyers & Company. PBS. BillMoyers.com. Public Affairs Television 
Inc. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. <http://billmoyers.com/episode/full-show-united-states-of-
alec/>. 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited 
Removal, Feb. 8, 2005. 
<http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view=&id=1892>. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ENFORCE Alien Removal Module (EARM),  January 2011, 
Enforcement Integrated Database (EID), December 2010. 
<www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/table36.xls>. 
“Uncovering the Criminal Alien Program." Miami Immigration Blog. Pozo Goldstein LLP, 06 Aug. 
2013. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. <http://www.pozogoldstein.com/Miami-Immigration-
Blog/2013/August/UNCOVERING-THE-CRIMINAL-ALIEN-PROGRAM.aspx>. 
United States. 111th Congress. Government Accountability Office. Report to Congressional 
Requesters: IMMI-GRATION ENFORCEMENT Better Controls Needed over 
Program Authorizing State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws. 
United States Government Accountability Office, Jan. 2009. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf>. 
“US: Prosecuting Migrants Is Hurting Families." HRW.org. Human Rights Watch, 22 May 2013. 
Web. 14 Oct. 2013. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/22/us-prosecuting-migrants-
hurting-families>. 
Vaughn, Jessica, and James R. Edwards, Jr. "The 287(g) Program: Protecting Home Towns and 
Homeland." CIS.org. Center for Immigration Studies, Oct. 2009. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.cis.org/287greport>. 
Volpe, Michael. "Allegation: ICE Fast-tracks Amnesty for Illegal Aliens to Clear Immigration-court 
Backlog." DailyCaller.com. The Daily Caller, 04 Apr. 2012. Web. 8 Dec. 2012. 
<http://dailycaller.com/2012/04/04/allegation-ice-fast-tracks-amnesty-for-illegal-
aliens-to-clear-immigration-court-backlog/>. 
Wadsworth, Tim. "Is Immigration Responsible for the Crime Drop? An Assessment of the Inﬂuence 
of Immigration on Changes in Violent Crime Between 1990 and 2000n."Social 
Science Quarterly 91.2 (2010): 531-53. Jon Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City 
  Irving 80  
University of New York. Web. 28 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/Wadsworth.pdf>. 
Waslin, Michelle. "The Criminal Alien Program: Big, Old, and 
Misunderstood."ImmigrationImpact.com. American Immigration Council, 17 Feb. 
2010. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. <http://immigrationimpact.com/2010/02/17/the-criminal-
alien-program-big-old-and-misunderstood/>. 
Weissman, Deborah M., Rebecca C. Headen, and Katherine L. Parker. "The Policies and Politics of 
Local Immigration Enforcement Laws: 287(g) Program in North 
Carolina."Law.UNC.edu. American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal 
Foundation, Immigration & Human Rights Policy Clinic University of North 
Carolina Chapel Hill, Feb. 2009. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf>. 
“What Is ALEC?" ALECExposed.org. Center for Media and Democracy. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.alecexposed.org/wiki/What_is_ALEC>. 
“Who's Who of The Corporation Film." TheCorporation.com. Big Picture Media Corporation. Web. 
27 Oct. 2013. <http://www.thecorporation.com/index.cfm?page_id=3>. 
Zamudio, Maria. "The Chicago Reporter." ChicagoReporter.com. The Chicago  
Reporter, 01 May 2013. Web. 31 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.chicagoreporter.com/news/2013/05/speedy-removal>. 
Zavodny, Madeline, and Tamar Jacoby. Filling the Gap: Less-Skilled Immigration in a Changing 
Economy. Rep. American Enterprise Institute, June 2013. Web. 16 Oct. 2013. 
<http://www.aei.org/files/2013/06/10/-zavodny-filling-the-gap-immigration-
report_140631709214.pdf>. 
